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INTRODUCTION
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),1
reformulated and institutionalized as the World Trade
Organization (WTO)2 in 1994, has provided much of the
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed in 1947, was created
by the Bretton Woods meetings that took place in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire
(U.S.), in 1944, setting out a plan for economic recovery after World War II, by
encouraging reduction in tariffs and other international trade barriers. General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GAT]. The GATT is one of the three mechanisms for global economic
governance established at Bretton Woods, the other two being the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The GATT was a collection of rules
applied temporarily, without an institutional basis, unlike the WTO, which is a
permanent organization with a permanent framework and its own Secretariat.
Compare GATT, supra, art. XXIX with Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, art II, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 13 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. For
almost fifty years, the GAIT focused exclusively on trade in goods, leaving tariffs
and quotas aside in the various rounds of negotiations of the world trading system.
The GAIT set the terms for countries who wanted to trade with each other. The
GATT signatories were called "contracting parties." See GATT, supra, art. II ("Each
contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties
treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement."). The Uruguay Round, completed
in 1994, replaced the GATT with the WTO, a global trade agency with binding
enforcements of comprehensive rules expanding beyond trade. See WTO Agreement,
supra, art. I. The GATT' has now become one of the eighteen agreements enforced
by the WTO.
2. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a global trade agency that was
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framework through which international trade has flourished for
over fifty years. The post-war philosophy of trade liberalization
has also paved the way to the creation of regional trade
agreements.3
Regional and multilateral4  trade arrangements have
established through the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement signed in 1994. Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. The WTO provides
dispute resolution, administration, and continuing negotiations for the seventeen
substantive agreements that it enforces. WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. III.
The WTO and its underlying agreements set a system of comprehensive governance
that goes far beyond trade rules. It is argued by some commentators (Lori Wallach
being one of the most relevant activists in the public domain) that the WTO system,
rules, and procedures are undemocratic and non-transparent. See, e.g., Lori Wallach,
Transparency in WTO Dispute Resolution, 31 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 773, 774
(2000). The WTO's substantive rules systematically prioritize trade over all other
goals and values. Each WTO member is required to ensure "the conformity of its
laws, regulations and administrative procedures" to the WTO's substantive rules.
WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. XVI(4). National policies and laws found to
violate WTO rules must be eliminated or changed; otherwise, the violating country
faces trade sanctions. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, art. 22, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. [hereinafter DSU]. The
economic, social and environmental upheaval being suffered by many countries that
have lived under the WTO regime since 1995 means that business-as-usual at the
WTO is over. It remains to be seen whether the handful of powerful WTO members
who have dictated WTO policy since 1995 will adapt to the new reality. By the same
token, it is also unclear whether countries demanding changes to the WTO's current
system of rules that are damaging their national interests may begin to withdraw if
those changes do not take place. Regarding withdrawal from the WTO Agreement,
although Article XV (1) is clear and reads that "Any Member may withdraw from
this Agreement. Such withdrawal shall apply both to this Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements and shall take effect upon the expiration of six
months from the date on which written notice of withdrawal is received by the
Director-General" of the WTO, the withdrawal from certain rules or agreements is
not entirely clear. WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. XV(1).
3. Regional trade agreements under GATT Article XXIV have effects of trade
creation as well as of trade diversion. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX1V. Trade creation
has resulted from the expansion of trade with efficient suppliers within the free
trade or customs union area while trade diversion could be found as there might be a
shift in trade from efficient suppliers outside the RTA to those inside just to get the
benefit from the trade preferences. But, I would argue that the creation of regional
trade agreements can have a significantly positive effect on the growth of world
trade and the willingness of countries to subsequently make the concessions they
have already done through their regional trade arrangement multilaterally. As
entities, regional trade areas can be constructive to liberal principles if they do not
turn inwards and do not place undue restrictions on trade with other WTO nations.
4. In the WTO context, multilateral negotiations, as opposed to plurilateral
negotiations, imply the participation of all WTO members. See WTO Agreement,
supra note 1, art. 11(3). The nature of the consequent multilateral agreements from
these multilateral negotiations implies that commitments are taken by all the WTO
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promoted this growth in trade with the creation of institutions
and procedures, particularly dispute settlement systems,
through which signatories can ensure and enforce predictable
and stable business environments for their citizens. During
negotiations, state actors formulate institutions and structures
within the agreements to enable the dispute settlement
processes which may be most effective in resolving these
disputes. The primary purpose of dispute settlement systems in
international trade agreements is to "guarantee respect for the
agreement(s), in responding to violations and legitimate
expectations under such agreements."5 The existence of rules,
however, is not the only factor determining whether a dispute
settlement system is effective.
The political will, a calculus of the numerous domestic and
international interests, of states to undertake the legal
obligations of a trading system determines the effectiveness of
the institutions created. Furthermore, although the political will
of the states may support the institutional framework that has
been negotiated, the political will to resolve any particular
dispute determines whether and how it will be resolved. The
available data thus seems to support Robert Hudec's proposition
regarding the importance of political will in determining the
effectiveness of international legal systems derived from the
GATT experience. 6 He has stated that "political will is really
more important than rigorously binding procedures - that
strong procedures by themselves are not likely to make a legal
system very effective if they do not have sufficient political will
behind them."7
The importance of political will to the effectiveness of the
dispute settlement rules of the WTO and Chapter 20 of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)8 will be
members. The GATT was a multilateral instrument as well, but a series of new
agreements were adopted during the Tokyo Round on a multilateral (selective)
basis, which caused a fragmentation of the multilateral trading system. See
Statement of the GAT Director-General on the Tokyo Round, Apr. 12, 1979, 18
I.L.M. 553.
5. Gabrielle Marceau, The Dispute Settlement Rules of the North American
Free Trade Agreement: A Thematic Comparison with the Dispute Settlement Rules of
the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO
DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 489, 491 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed.,1997).
6. Robert E. Hudec, The New Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of
the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 14 (1999).
7. Id. at 11.
8. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a radical
experiment in rapid deregulation of trade and investment among the United States,
[Vol. 16:1
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examined in this article. 9 In the WTO, where the dispute
settlement procedures appear to be rule-oriented, 10 as displayed
in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU),11 there has been an effective
compliance record overall. However, in politically sensitive
cases, compliance has been slow or nonexistent, and there has
Mexico, and Canada. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Since 1995, NAFTA is
considered the symbol of the failed corporate globalization model because its results
for most people in all three countries have been negative: real wages are lower and
millions of jobs have been lost; farm income is down and farm bankruptcies are up;
environmental and health conditions along the U.S.-Mexico boarder have declined;
and a series of environmental and other public interest standards have been
attacked under NAFTA. NAFTA's agricultural provisions have been so extreme that
Mexican family farmers are demanding a re-negotiation or nullification of the
treaty, after its first phase of initial implementation led to displacement of millions
of Mexican farmers. NAFTA represents the gold standard of corporate rights in
trade and investment agreements because it includes hitherto unheard of corporate
privileges, including investor-to-state dispute resolutions, which is the right to sue
governments for cash compensation in closed trade tribunals over regulatory costs.
This right, contained in NAFTA's Chapter 11 on investment, has been used by
numerous multinational corporations to seek financial compensation for public
health and safety, or environmental regulations that corporations argue amount to
expropriation of their current or future lost profits. NAFTA, supra, ch. 11. NAFTA
Chapter 11 corporate suits have resulted in the lifting of a Canadian ban on a toxic
chemical as well as an attack on a similar California state toxic chemical ban, and
the payout of U.S. $16 million by waste dump to be built on ecologically protected
land.
9. As we will see later, the principal dispute settlement mechanisms of the
NAFTA are found in Chapter 11, Chapter 19, and Chapter 20. NAFTA, supra note 8.
10. For discussion on rule-oriented as opposed to power-oriented diplomacy, see
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 109-11 (2nd ed., 1997).
11. DSU, supra note 2. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is one of
the most important new features of the WTO. The DSU established a system of
review and procedures for when one of the WTO members complains that the
actions or policies of another member have harmed it through a violation of WTO
rules. Id. Typically, a complaint would be followed by consultations, possible
arbitration, then the formation of a panel of experts, the panel ruling, possible
appeal to the Appellate Body, and, based on the outcome of the case, either
compliance, compensation to the complaining country, or eventual retaliation. The
WTO's system of settling disputes provides for specific deadlines, and is therefore
quicker than the old GATT system. Its type of functioning is more automatic, which
reduces the number of blockages compared to the GATT system. The rules
concerning the establishment of the findings process are more detailed than they
were under the GATT system. Panel reports and Appellate Body rulings can be
overturned only by a unanimous vote of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which
is a WTO body that rules on dispute settlement cases under the DSU. The DSB
consists of all members of the WTO General Council, that is to say, all WTO
members' representatives in Geneva, who oversee the operation of all of the
constituent WTO Agreements in general. The DSB rules on actions taken under the
DSU.
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been a growing use of Article 21.512 Panels. 13 The NAFTA
Chapter 20, the sole government-to-government dispute
settlement mechanism in the NAFTA, is geared to bilateral,
negotiated resolutions, as there are fewer detailed rules
governing the procedures and implementations of rulings. 14
12. The locution "Article 21.5 Panel" refers to Article 21.5 of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, which reads:
Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a
covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through
recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever
possible resort to the original panel. The panel shall circulate its report
within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to it. When the
panel considers that it cannot provide its report within this time
frame, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay
together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its
report.
DSU, supra note 2, art. 21.5.
13. As an overview of the WTO disputes resolved by the DSB rulings and
recommendations, we acknowledge that there were a total of 52 matters and 68
complaints in the DSB between 1995 and 2001. Among other categories, apart from
the cases which had negative rulings or the time-period for implementation had not
been determined or had not yet expired, 27 matters and 38 complaints had expired
time periods for implementation. Ten matters and 18 complaints had completed
implementation, but the remaining disputes had had some implementation
problems, such as extensive resorts to 21.5 Panels. The following cases used 21.5
proceedings: Panel Report, Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and
Exporters of Automotive Leather, WT/DS126/R (May 25, 1999); Appellate Body
Report, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/RW (May 9,
2000); Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WT/DS70/RW (May 9, 2000); Panel Report, United States - Anti-Dumping
Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of one Megabit
or Above from Korea, WT/DS99/RW (Nov. 7, 2000); Appellate Body Report, Canada -
Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products -
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the United States,
WT/DS103/RW, WT/DS113/RW (July 11, 2001); Appellate Body Report, European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas -
Recourse to Article 21.5 by the European Communities, WT/DS27/RW/EEC (Apr. 12,
1999); Panel Report, Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/R (Jan. 28, 2000); Appellate Body
Report, Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct.
20, 1998); Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations", WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000); and Appellate Body Report, United
States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R
(Oct. 12, 1998). United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the
European Communities - Hormones Dispute went to a 22.6 Panel because there had
been non-implementation. WT/DS320.
14. NAFTA, supra note 8, ch. 20. The dispute settlement provisions of Chapter
20 are applicable to all disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the
NAFTA. The steps set out in Chapter 20 are intended to resolve disputes by
[Vol. 16:1
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Until 2001, there were only three completed cases pursuant to
the NAFTA Chapter 20,15 (a fourth had begun soon thereafter 6),
two of which required compliance measures. 17 Those two cases
involved politically sensitive issues and have had some
compliance difficulties.18 While the empirical data on the success
of both dispute settlement systems is limited due to their
relatively short period of existence, both the NAFTA Chapter 20
and the WTO dispute settlement systems illustrate that, in
cases where there are politically sensitive issues, the
effectiveness of the systems is dependent on the political will of
the losing party to comply rather than on the complexity of the
existing rules.
Within this political framework, there are cases that could
be brought in either the WTO or the NAFTA Chapter 20 forum.
The NAFTA party will of course choose the forum in which it
calculates it has the best chance to win and compel the other
side to change or remove its injurious measures. This article will
argue that, in cases where forum shopping is possible, there are
no set, determinative factors that dictate the proper forum for
any particular dispute, despite the differences in complexity of
the rules. Instead, each dispute has to be dealt with on a case-
by-case basis. However, this article will make recommendations
agreement, if at all possible. The process begins with government-to-government
(the Parties) consultations. If the dispute is not resolved, a Party may request a
meeting of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (comprised of the Trade Ministers of
the Parties). If the Commission is unable to resolve the dispute, a consulting Party
may call for the establishment of a five-member arbitral panel.
Chapter 20 also provides for scientific review boards which may be selected
by a panel, in consultation with the disputing Party, to provide a written report on
any factual issue concerning environmental, health, safety or other scientific
matters to assist panels in rendering their decisions. As well, disputes relating to
the following chapters may be referred to dispute settlement procedures under
Chapter 20: Chapter 7 (Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures);
Chapter 10 (Government Procurement); Chapter 11 (Non-compliance of a Party with
a final award); and Chapter 14 (Financial Services).
NAFTA, supra note 8.
15. Panel Report, Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin
Agricultural Products, CDA-95-2008-01 (Dec. 2, 1996) (hereinafter Canadian
Agricultural Products); Panel Report, U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broom Corn
Brooms from Mexico, USA-97-2008-01 (Jan. 30, 1998) (hereinafter Broomcorn);
Panel Report, Cross-Border Trucking Services, USA-MEX-98-2008-01 (Feb. 6, 2001)
(hereinafter Trucking).
16. Cross-Border Bus Services (Mexico v. United States, 1998) case no. USA-98-
2008-02.
17. The U.S. unsuccessfully challenged Canadian tariffs in Canadian
Agricultural Products. Supra note 15.
18. Broomcorn, supra note 15; Trucking, supra note 15.
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on the factors that the parties should take into account to decide
on the proper forum. First, in order to make this comparison,
Part I will look at the background, institutional structures, and
record of the WTO and the NAFTA dispute settlement systems.
Second, Part II will present a comparison of the advantages and
disadvantages of each system from the perspective of
complaining and respondent parties. Finally, on the basis of the
discussion in the previous two sections, the article will conclude
with suggestions of specific factors that might affect the choice
of forum in which forum shopping is possible.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WTO AND THE NAFTA
A. BACKGROUND
The WTO Dispute Settlement system has its roots in the
1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which
provided a procedural platform for dispute settlement and
established guiding principles for periodic multilateral
negotiations on a product-by-product basis.19 The NAFTA, on
the other hand, was a far more ambitious project that, in many
ways, had the benefit of over 40 years of GATT dispute
settlement, as well as the example of regional integration and
dispute settlement in the European Community. Whereas the
GATT was prototypical and evolved piecemeal over time, the
NAFTA's drafters were concerned about the potential for a
regional dispute settlement system to intrude on national
sovereignty and sought to limit its extent. For this reason, the
NAFTA Articles 201720 and 201821 are considered to provide a
19. See discussion supra, note 1.
20. NAFTA Article 2017 reads:
1. The panel shall present to the disputing Parties a final report,
including any separate opinions on matters not unanimously agreed,
within 30 days of presentation of the initial report, unless the
disputing Parties otherwise agree.
2. No panel may, either in its initial report or its final report, disclose
which panelists are associated with majority or minority opinions.
3. The disputing Parties shall transmit to the Commission the final
report of the panel, including any report of a scientific review board
established under Article 2015, as well as any written views that a
disputing Party desires to be appended, on a confidential basis within
a reasonable period of time after it is presented to them.
4. Unless the Commission decides otherwise, the final report of the
[Vol. 16:1
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soft resolution to disputes, a fair contrast even to the definitive
language of GATT Article XXIII:2, 22 as later elaborated upon by
the DSU. This section will look at the background of both
systems and then compare their institutional structures.
As mentioned above, GATT Articles XXI123 and XXII124 have
panel shall be published 15 days after it is transmitted to the
Commission.
NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 2017.
21. NAFTA Article 2018 reads:
1. On receipt of the final report of a panel, the disputing Parties shall
agree on the resolution of the dispute, which normally shall conform
with the determinations and recommendations of the panel, and shall
notify their Sections of the Secretariat of any agreed resolution of any
dispute.
2. Wherever possible, the resolution shall be non-implementation or
removal of a measure not conforming with this Agreement or causing
nullification or impairment in the sense of Annex 2004 or, failing
such a resolution, compensation.
Id. art. 2018.
22. GATT Article XXIII:2 reads:
If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties
concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type
described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make
appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they
consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate.
The CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any
appropriate inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider
such consultation necessary. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider
that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may
authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any
other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations
under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the
circumstances. If the application to any contracting party of any
concession or other obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party
shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such action is taken, to
give written notice to the Executive Secretary [Director-General] to the
Contracting Parties of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and
such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the day
on which such notice is received by him.
GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII(2).
23. GATT Article XXII reads:
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to,
and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such
representations as may be made by another contracting party with
respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a
contracting party, consult with any contracting party or parties in
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
provided the basis for the WTO Dispute Settlement system
which exists today. In 1947, the treaty text, however, stipulated
only a loosely-structured organization through which the parties
were to address their conflicts.25 Instead, the Contracting
Parties developed their processes and practices for dispute
respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a
satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.
Id. art. XXII.
24. GATT Article XXIII reads:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing
to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is
being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations
under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment
of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other
contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic
consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting
parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of
the type described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the matter may
be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so
referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the
contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a
ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The CONTRACTING
PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate
inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider such
consultation necessary. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider
that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they
may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the
application to any other contracting party or parties of such
concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they
determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the application
to any contracting party of any concession or other obligation is in
fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than
sixty days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the
Executive Secretary24.to the Contracting Parties of its intention to
withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect
upon the sixtieth day following the day on which such notice is
received by him.
Id. art. XXIII.
25. Hudec, supra note 6, at 2.
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resolution over the years.26
From 1948 to 1978, the GATT dispute settlement
procedures were primarily diplomatically based, comprising of
few standardized procedures, vague legal rulings, and
negotiated outcomes.27 At first, the Contracting Parties had
their disputes considered during their plenary semiannual
meetings.28 Later, ad hoc working parties were set up to look at
all the disputes or particular disputes brought to the GATT. 29
The working parties in the GATT, by definition, were comprised
of contracting parties, so each contracting party had to send a
representative for the meeting. The process became slightly
more formalized in the 1950s under the GATT Director General
Eric Wyndham-White, where panels of experts were used to
decide disputes. 30 These panels, unlike the working parties,
were made up of individuals acting on their own accord and not
as representatives of their governments-although the choice of
panelists was usually among the national representatives to the
GATT. John H. Jackson argues that this shift signified an
attempt by the contracting parties to make the GATT dispute
settlement system a rule-oriented system rather than one more
based on power and negotiated settlement by the parties. 31
However, once a panel decided a matter, the losing party could
essentially veto and prevent the adoption of the panel decision
because the report needed to be adopted through consensus.
Despite the blocking possibilities, the early GATT adjudication
system worked very well because the GATT member
governments wanted it to work.32 Hudec argues that this is
because the early GATT was made up of a small group of like-
minded trade policy officials who themselves had written the
GATT language and did not require an elaborate decision-
making procedure to generate a consensus. 33
Despite the successes of the 1950s, the GATT dispute
settlement procedures were not used again until the 1970s.34
During this period, there were fundamental changes in the
GATT membership with the creation of the European
26. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 114-15.
27. Hudec, supra note 6, at 4.
28. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 115.
29. Id. at 109-11.
30. Id. at 115-16.
31. Id.
32. Hudec, supra note 6, at 6.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Community and the inclusion of many developing countries:
"[sluddenly, the conventional wisdom of GATT was that
lawsuits were a nonproductive way to approach any problem."35
There was only a slow return to the system in the 1970s in the
attempt to address non-tariff barriers.36 However, it was only in
1979, through the efforts of the United States, that the system
was truly brought back into operation, and the basic operating
procedures were written down in the 1979 Tokyo Round
Understanding.37
Despite the problems with the system in the early 1980s
due to the dramatic increase in the GATT membership and the
politicization of many politically sensitive disputes, increases in
the Secretariat staff and growing faith in the integrity of the
system promoted a very successful system by the end of the
1980s.3 8 It should be noted that this system was effective despite
the fact that there were few concrete procedures and that the
whole system was voluntary. Hudec argues that the procedural
weaknesses had little impact on the overall success of the GATT
because of the political will of the governments to have working
legal order:
Although the procedure was not compulsory, defendant governments
almost always decided to cooperate with it. They did so under the
pressure of a strong community consensus that every GATT member
should have a right to have its legal claims heard by an impartial
third-party decision-maker ... Although compliance was not always
forthcoming, the pressure to comply was almost always there once the
community arrived at a consensus that the ruling was correct. As for
the power to veto the authorization of trade sanctions, that hardly
mattered at all, because there were almost no requests for permission
to employ trade sanctions. As in the 1950s, the ruling seemed to be
enough.39
Thus by the Uruguay Round negotiations, the GATT
dispute settlement system had become one "built solidly on the
authority of legally binding obligations."40 And, many of the new
DSU procedures were a codification of the processes already
established in the GATT.41 After forty-seven years, the dispute
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Hudec suggests that there was over an 80% success rate in disposing of
disputes. He does not give the compliance rate for those decisions, however. Hudec,
supra note 6, at 8.
39. Id. at 9-10.
40. Id. at 10-11.
41. Id. at 11; Annex 1A Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods,
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settlement system was fully integrated into the text of the
GATT 1994 treaty as a mandatory treaty obligation, not as
interpretations or understandings of practices of GATT Articles
XXII and XXIII.42
While keeping many facets of the previous system, the DSU
has brought to bear several fundamental institutional changes
in the dispute settlement system to provide "security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system."43 First, the
new dispute mechanism, comprising twenty-seven sections with
a total of 147 paragraphs and four appendices, is more detailed
than the GATT procedures." Second, the WTO system remedied
the fragmentation of the GATT and forum shopping possibilities
for those contracting parties signatory to the plurilateral codes
of the GATT. 45 Marceau argues that the creation of the
integrated system of dispute settlement in the WTO was one of
the best success stories of the Uruguay Round negotiations. 46
Third, the GATT Council was replaced with the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB), which is essentially the General
Council (GC) in a different guise. Comprised of representatives
from each Member, the DSB has the responsibility of
administering the dispute settlement system. 47 Fourth, there
has been a change to a negative consensus system, which
ensures that the losing party cannot block the formation of a
panel.48 Fifth, an Appellate Body now provides for appeal from
the panel decisions .49 Finally, the complaining party can seek
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
42. JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS § 7.2, at 340 (3d ed. 1995).
43. DSU, supra note 2, art. 3(2).
44. AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 59 (Konstantinos
Adamantopoulos ed., Kluwer Law International Ltd 1997).
45. Marceau, supra note 5, at 495-96.
46. Id.
47. AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 44, at 61.
48. A dispute settlement panel in the WTO is a body established ad hoc to give
a ruling in a trade-related dispute between two trading nations of the WTO. In the
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, panels consist of three experts who examine
and issue recommendations (Panel Report) on a particular dispute in the light of
WTO provisions. The Report is then adopted by the DSB, and may be appealed to
the Appellate Body. DSU, supra note 2.
49. The Appellate Body (AB) is the seven-person body established by the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Body to hear and resolve appeals made by WTO
Members from recommendations in dispute settlement cases made by dispute
settlement panels. The members of the AB are appointed for four years (renewable
once) and are experts in international trade law. Id. art. 17.
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authorization to take retaliatory action should the losing party
fail to implement the panel recommendation within a
reasonable period of time.50
The NAFTA is a comprehensive free trade agreement
created under Article XXIV51 of the GATT.52 The NAFTA came
50. AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 44, at 59.
51. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV. GATT Article XXIV reads:
1. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan
customs territories of the contracting parties and to any other customs
territories in respect of which this Agreement has been accepted
under Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or
pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application. Each such
customs territory shall, exclusively for the purposes of the territorial
application of this Agreement, be treated as though it were a
contracting party; Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall
not be construed to create any rights or obligations as between two or
more customs territories in respect of which this Agreement has been
accepted under Article XXVI or is being applied under Article
XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application oy a
single contracting party.
2. For the purposes of this Agreement a customs territory shall be
understood to mean any territory with respect to which separate
tariffs or other regulations of commerce are maintained for a
substantial part of the trade of such territory with other territories.
3. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed to
prevent:
(a) Advantages accorded by any contracting party to adjacent
countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic;
(b) Advantages accorded to the trade with the Free Territory of
Trieste by countries contiguous to that territory, provided that such
advantages are not in conflict with the Treaties of Peace arising out of
the Second World War.
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements,
of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties
to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a
customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade
between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the
trade of other contracting parties with such territories.
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent,
as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a
customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim
agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a
free-trade area; Provided that:
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading
to a formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of
commerce imposed at the institution of any such union or interim
agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not parties to
such union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more
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restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of
commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the
formation of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, as
the case may be;
(b) with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading
to the formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other regulations
of commerce maintained in each of the constituent territories and
applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the adoption of
such interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not
included in such area or not parties to such agreement shall not be
higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other
regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories
prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement as
the case may be; and
(c) any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b)
shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs
union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time.
6. If, in fulfilling the requirements of subparagraph 5 (a), a
contracting party proposes to increase any rate of duty inconsistently
with the provisions of Article II, the procedure set forth in Article
XXVIII shall apply. In providing for compensatory adjustment, due
account shall be taken of the compensation already afforded by the
reduction brought about in the corresponding duty of the other
constituents of the union.
7. (a)Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union
or free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of
such a union or area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING
PARTIES and shall make available to them such information
regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to make
such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may
deem appropriate.
(b) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an
interim agreement referred to in paragraph 5 in consultation with the
parties to that agreement and taking due account of the information
made available in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph
(a), the CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such agreement is not
likely to result in the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade
area within the period contemplated by the parties to the agreement
or that such period is not a reasonable one, the CONTRACTING
PARTIES shall make recommendations to the parties to the
agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the
case may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in
accordance with these recommendations.
(c) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in
paragraph 5 (c) shall be communicated to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, which may request the contracting parties concerned to
consult with them if the change seems likely to jeopardize or delay
unduly the formation of the customs union or of the free-trade area.
8. For the purposes of this Agreement:
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of
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into being in 1994, and replaced the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except,
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV,
XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade
between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect
to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories,
and,
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same
duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the
members of the union to the trade of territories not included in the
union;
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or
more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted
under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in
products originating in such territories.
9. The preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article I shall not
be affected by the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade
area but may be eliminated or adjusted by means of negotiations with
contracting parties affected.* This procedure of negotiations with
affected contracting parties shall, in particular, apply to the
elimination of preferences required to conform with the provisions of
paragraph 8 (a)(i) and paragraph 8 (b).
10. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may by a two-thirds majority
approve proposals which do not fully comply with the requirements
of paragraphs 5 to 9 inclusive, provided that such proposals lead to
the formation of a customs union or a free-trade area in the sense of
this Article.
11. Taking into account the exceptional circumstances arising out of
the establishment of India and Pakistan as independent States and
recognizing the fact that they have long constituted an economic unit,
the contracting parties agree that the provisions of this Agreement
shall not prevent the two countries from entering into special
arrangements with respect to the trade between them, pending the
establishment of their mutual trade relations on a definitive basis.*
12. Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as
may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this
Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities
within its territories.
52. NA.FTA, supra note 8, Article 101. The Agreement covers trade in goods,
the phased-out elimination of tariffs within a decade-long period (mostly within five
years, and some in fifteen years), the elimination of quotas and licensing
requirements, detailed rules of origin, customs procedures, energy, agriculture,
emergency safeguards, technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary
measures (SPS), government procurement, telecommunications, financial services,
competition policy, intellectual property, and, as mentioned above, three side
agreements on imports and "trade and" issues.
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Agreement (CUSFTA),5 3 which had been formed in 1989, by
expanding the scope of the Agreement and adding an additional
member, Mexico.
The dispute settlement procedures in the NAFTA and its
predecessor, the CUSFTA, have themselves had a limited
caseload, 54 but they have benefited from the hindsight of the
fifty years of GATT procedures. Indeed the North American
regional trading system has "borrowed from practices developed
in the GATT forum." 55 Marceau states that "[the FTA] dispute
settlement provisions were, by and large, the same as the
WTO/GATT procedures as they emerged from the Uruguay
Round. Indeed some Uruguay Round innovations in the
GATT/WTO procedures were first implemented in the
[CUSFTA] ."56
A main difference between the WTO and NAFTA dispute
settlement systems is the NAFTA's definite reliance on
diplomatic solutions. Despite the similarities with the WTO
procedures which will be examined below, the NAFTA dispute
settlement procedures are based on "cooperation and
consultation"57 between the NAFTA countries, and focus on
53. The 1989 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement was the model for
NAFTA. See Canada-United States: Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2,
1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter CUSFTA]. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
was a trade agreement reached by Canada and the United Staes in October 1987.
The FTA provided for the gradual elimination of tariffs and reductions in non-tariff
trade barriers on goods. On January 1, 1998, all tariffs on Canada and U.S. origin
goods were eliminated, with the exception of a limited number of over-quota tariffs
associated with tariff quotas on some agricultural products. These tariff quotas
replaced earlier non-tariff measures and were implemented by both the U.S. and
Canada in 1995 as part of the outcome of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations. The Agreement also incorporated more effective dispute settlement
processes. The Agreement removed several trade restrictions in stages over a ten
year period, and resulted in a great increase in cross-border trade. A few years later,
it was superseded by the NAFTA, which included Mexico as well. It was fought
vigorously by Canadian citizens' groups as a massive instrument of environmental
deregulation, downward pressure on wages and labor standards, as well as
weakening of social programs. This Agreement was the first of the comprehensive
international commercial agreements that have replaced traditional trade
agreements.
54. As of 2001, the total caseload for the NAFTA dispute settlement systems
was 80 disputes. There were 76 panel reviews under Chapter 19 (26 active) and 4
arbitral panels under Chapter 20 (1 active). NAFTA Secretariat Status Report of
Active and Completed NAFTA Panels, NAFTA Secretariat, U.S. Section, July 17,
2001.
55. Marceau, supra note 5, at 489.
56. Id.
57. Chapter Twenty (Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement
Procedures) of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Exporter's
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bilateral, negotiated solutions to disputes. The dispute
procedures, contained in 19 Articles in Chapter 20, on which
this article will focus, are less complicated than those of the
WTO and are, in theory, supposed to be quicker. While the
empirical evidence does not show automatic compliance, it does
show political impetus to resolve disputes in a timeframe
practicable to the losing party, as we will see below.
Unlike the WTO, which has an integrated dispute
settlement system, .the NAFTA's enforcement mechanisms are
contained in five separate dispute settlement mechanisms: 58 1)
the government-to-government dispute settlement system,
under Chapter 20; 2) the bi-national panels for adjudication of
anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures, under Chapter
19; 3) various sector-specific measures, such as Chapter 11 for
investment, for arbitration and/or dispute resolution, including
more specific consultation for processes; 4) the use of national
adjudication systems, especially for intellectual property and
government procurement disputes; and 5) dispute resolution for
the side agreements on labor and environmental issues.
For adequate comparison with the parallel WTO dispute
settlement measures, this article will focus on the sole dispute
settlement mechanism within the NAFTA that consists of
government-to-government disputes, and which pertains to the
"avoidance or settlement of all disputes between the Parties
regarding the interpretation or application of this Agreement..
• .-59 The other dispute settlement mechanisms-for example,
under Chapter 1960 and Chapter 11,61 pertaining to anti-
Guides to U.S. Trade Agreements (Trade Compliance Ctr., U.S. Dep't of Commerce),
http://www.mac.doc.gov/Tcc/e-guides/egnaf2O.html (11114/2001).
58. Marceau, supra note 5, at 495.
59. NAFTA supra note 8, art. 2004. For the jurisdiction of the Chapter 20
dispute settlement mechanism, please see Annex 2004 following in the text. Id.
60. Chapter 19, Article 1904 (Review of Final Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Determinations) establishes a mechanism to provide an alternative to judicial
review by domestic courts of final determinations in antidumping and countervailing
duty cases, with review by independent bi-national panels. A Panel is established
when a Request for Panel Review is filed with the NAFTA Secretariat by an
industry asking for a review of an investigating authority's decision involving
imports from a NAFTA country. Id. art. 1904.
In Canada, it is the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), which makes
dumping and subsidy determinations, while the Canadian International Trade
Tribunal (CLIT) conducts injury inquiries as to whether or not the dumping or
subsidy has caused injury or retardation (material retardation of the establishment
of a domestic industry) or is threatening to cause injury to the domestic industry.
In the United States of America, it is the Department of Commerce, International
Trade Administration, which makes dumping and subsidy determinations, while the
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dumping and countervailing duties, and investment measures,
respectively-allow the involvement of private parties from the
NAFTA countries to be party to the dispute settlement
proceedings. Therefore, the focus will be on Chapter 20 disputes.
The Chapter 20 dispute settlement mechanism is similar to
its predecessor, Chapter 18 under CUSFTA, with few
modifications.62 The Parties can bring a dispute under Chapter
20:
1. If any Party considers that any benefit it could reasonably have
expected to accrue to it under any provision of: (a) Part Two (Trade in
Goods), except for those provisions of Annex 300-A (Automotive Sector)
or Chapter Six (Energy) relating to investment, (b) Part Three
(Technical Barriers to Trade), (c) Chapter Twelve (Cross-Border Trade
in Services), or (d) Part Six (Intellectual Property), is being nullified or
impaired as a result of the application of any measure that is not
inconsistent with this Agreement, the party may have recourse to
dispute settlement under this Chapter.
2. A Party may not invoke: (a) paragraph 1(a) or (b), to the extent that
the benefit arises from any cross-border trade in services provision of
Part Two, or (b) paragraph 1(c) or (d) , with respect to any measure
subject to an exception under Article 2101 (General Exceptions).63
Under this Chapter, disputes arising under the NAFTA and
the GATT obligations or "any successor agreement," such as the
United States International Trade Commission conducts injury inquiries.
In Mexico, it is the Secretaria de Economia, Unidad de Prdcticas
Comerciales Internacionales that makes both the dumping/subsidy and injury
determinations.
These agencies are referred to as investigating authorities. The dumping,
subsidy and injury determinations of the investigating authorities can also be
appealed, in Canada to the Federal Court of Canada, in the United States to the
Court of International Trade, and in Mexico to the Tribunal Fiscal de la Federaci6n..
61. Chapter 11, Section B (Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an
Investor of Another Party) establishes a mechanism for the settlement of investment
disputes that assures both equal treatment among investors of the Parties to the
Agreement in accordance with the principle of international reciprocity and due
process before an impartial tribunal. A NAFTA investor who alleges that a host
government has breached its investment obligations under Chapter 11 may, at its
option, have recourse to one of the following arbitral mechanisms: 1)the World
Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); 2)
ICSID's Additional Facility Rules; and 3) the rules of the United Nations
Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Rules).
Alternatively, the investor may choose the remedies available in the host
country's domestic courts. An important feature of the Chapter 11 arbitral
provisions is the enforceability in domestic courts of final awards by arbitration
tribunals. Id. ch. 11.
62. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOrT, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT
102 (1993).
63. NAFTA, supra note 8, Annex 2004.
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WTO, "may be settled in either forum at the discretion of the
complaining Party."64 However, if the Third NAFTA Party
requests it, or if the dispute involves specified environmental
agreements, SPS measures, or environment, health, safety, or
conservation standards, the dispute must be resolved through
the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism. 65 Once a proceeding
has begun under NAFTA Chapter 20 or the WTO, unless the
Party can appeal to any of the exceptions which are NAFTA-
specific, the "forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of the
other."66
B. INSTITUTIONAL SCENE
A comparison of the actual procedures for bringing cases
before the WTO and the NAFTA displays the difference in
complexity of the rules between the systems. In the WTO, when
one member believes that its rights under the WTO or other
listed trade agreements have been breached, it "undertakes to
accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate
opportunity for consultation" with the offending member which
"shall" be notified to the DSB. 67 In the NAFTA, when a party
believes that any existing or proposed measure or any other
measure enacted by the other party may affect the operation of
NAFTA, the complaining party "may" request consultations
with the other party.68 The "may" perhaps suggests sovereignty
64. Id. art. 2005(1).
65. Id. art. 2005(2)-(4); FREDERICK M. ABBOTr, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION: THE NAFTA AND WESTERN HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION SYSTEM 100 (1995).
66. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 2005(6).
67. DSU, supra note 2, art. 4.2-4.3. The offending Member must reply within
10 days (or if mutually agreed otherwise) and consultations must be held within 30
days of the original request (or 10 days if the goods involved are perishable). Id.
68. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 2006(1). With regards to third parties during the
consultations, if a WTO Member believes it has a substantial trade interest as a
third party, it may notify the DSB and the parties to the dispute of its desire to join
the proceedings. DSU, supra note 2, art. 4.11. The decision as to whether the third
party has a sufficiently large trade interest rests upon the respondent party (for the
purposes of consultations). Id. Where the Third Party deems itself to have a
substantial interest in the proceedings between the other Parties, it "shall be
entitled" to be a part of the consultations on delivery of written notice to the other
Parties and its Section of the NAFTA Secretariat. NAFTA, supra note 8, art.
2006(3). Note the difference with the WTO DSU Article 4.11 where the inclusion of
the third party Member is contingent upon the respondent party finding that the
.claim of substantial interest is well-founded." In the WTO, if the Party is not
allowed to join the proceeding already initiated it has the ability to initiate its own
case. DSU, supra note 2, art. 4.11. In NAFTA, on the other hand, the Third Party
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concerns and leaves room for the parties to pursue other
possible options.
While the NAFTA's "may" appears weaker than the DSU
language, it is in fact the NAFTA that places more emphasis on
resolving a dispute at the consultation phase. In the DSU, the
text states that a "mutually acceptable" solution "is clearly to be
preferred."69 Also, where the parties fail to reach a solution
through consultations, they have an additional voluntary option
to resolve their differences. The Director General may act in an
ex officio capacity and provide "good offices, conciliation or
mediation" which may begin at any point in the dispute. 70 In
reality, over 30% of the disputes brought to the WTO from 1995
to 2001 have been resolved bilaterally, and another 14% have
been resolved in other ways. 71 Until 2001, the "good offices"
option had never been used, and in all of the remaining disputes
either the original party had not received a response to the
request for consultation within ten days of the original request
or the consultations had failed to accomplish a solution within
sixty days; thus the complaining party had asked the DSB to
establish a panel.72
The NAFTA language is stronger. The parties "should make
every attempt" to come to a resolution of the matter between
them in a mutually acceptable manner by a) providing sufficient
information to each other regarding their rights which have
been harmed under NAFTA, b) treating confidential or
proprietary information with the same level of care as the other
party, and c) trying to avoid a solution that adversely affects
any other party.7 3 And, the equivalent of the DSU's "good
offices" is mandatory in the NAFTA, which requires an
additional step of consultations with the NAFTA Free Trade
has the ability to join at the Panel stage and if it does not do so "shall refrain" from
initiating a similar dispute under NAFTA or at the WTO. NAFTA, supra note 8, art.
2008(3)-(4). A Third Party under NAIFTA (the sole NAFTA party not a party to the
case already) can join a dispute if it follows the stipulated procedures, whereas in
the WTO the inclusion of a third party is dependent on the assent of the respondent,
probably for the sake of efficient administration.
69. DSU, supra note 2, art. 3.7.
70. Id. art. 5.6. This has never been used in any dispute to date.
71. 36 out of 121 disputes were resolved bilaterally (DSU Article 3.6) and 17
out of 112 were resolved through other means (DSU Articles 3.1, 12.12, and others).
72. Id. art. 4.3, 4.5, 4.7. If more than one Member requests the establishment of
a Panel on the same matter, the same Panel will hear the claims of all the parties.
Id. art. 9.
73. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 2006(5).
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Commission if initial bilateral consultations fail.7 4 The NAFTA
Free Trade Commission, which is comprised of cabinet-level
representatives of the parties and oversees many aspects of the
proper functioning of NAFTA, must convene within ten days of
the delivery of the request and try to resolve the dispute. 75 The
Commission has the power to consult with experts or create
working groups or expert groups to gather more information; to
have recourse to good offices, conciliation, meditation, or such
other dispute resolution procedures; or make recommendations
whereby the parties may resolve their dispute in a satisfactory
manner.7 6 It is only if the Commission is unsuccessful in
resolving the dispute within thirty days, or another period of
time agreed upon by the Parties, that any of the parties may
request in writing the establishment of an arbitral panel which
the Commission will then establish. 77
The differences between the WTO and the NAFTA Chapter
20 in the consultation and panel establishment phase should be
considered. While the language of the DSU's rules on
consultations seems less geared to achieving a diplomatic
solution, over 44% of the disputes in which consultations are
requested never reach a panel. While it is not possible to assess
the success of the consultation phase of the NAFTA Chapter 20
because of the limited number of cases that have been decided,
it could be argued that this two-step consultation phase might
give the parties more opportunities to discuss solutions and
avoid legal proceedings. If all these consultations fail, however,
both systems have recourse to a panel. In the WTO, because of
the negative consensus-rule, a judicial-type panel is
automatically adopted within twenty days of the DSB's decision
to establish it.78 In the NAFTA, the Free Trade Commission, at
the behest of the parties, establishes an "arbitral" panel.79 While
74. The disputing Parties are to request in writing a meeting with the NAFTA
Free Trade Commission within 30 days of the initial consultation request, 45 days if
there has been the inclusion of another Party, 15 days if the matter was regarding
perishable goods, or any period of time agreed on by the Parties. Id. art. 2007(1).
75. Under NAFTA Article 2001.2, the Commission is to (a) supervise the
implementation of [NAFTA]; (b) oversee its further elaboration, (c) resolves disputes
that may arise regarding its interpretation or application; (d) supervise the work of
all committees and working groups established under this Agreement, referred to in
Annex 2001.21 and (e) consider any other matter that may affect the operation of
this Agreement. Id. 2001(2).
76. Id. art. 2007(5).
77. Id. art. 2008(1)-(2).
78. DSU, supra note 2, art. 7.
79. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 2008.
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a NAFTA panel functions in a similar fashion to one in the
WTO, by calling it an arbitral panel, the NAFTA countries seem
to have intended more of an arbitration-style approach to be
taken in the proceedings.
The first step to forming a panel in both systems is the
choosing of the panelists. WTO panels are composed of three
independent panelists who, among other stipulated
qualifications, have a "sufficiently diverse background and a
wide spectrum of experience."80 While the WTO Secretariat
keeps a record of potential panelists on file, the members are
free to choose any panelists who meet the requirements. 81
However, if panelists are not chosen by the members within
twenty days, the Director General, together with the Chairman
of the relevant Council/Committee, will make the choice.82 In
the NAFTA, five panelists are selected by the parties from a
roster, established by consensus among the NAFTA parties,
containing a list of individuals who each have three-year
terms.8 3 When two parties are involved, they need to agree on
the chair of the panel within fifteen days of the request to
establish the panel; if they cannot agree, the Party chosen by lot
shall within five days select a chair who is not a citizen of that
party.8 4 Within fifteen days of the selection of the chair, each
party must select two additional panelists who are citizens of
the other party and, again, if there is a lack of agreement, the
parties use a system of lots.85 When all three NAFTA parties are
involved, the procedures for choosing the chair are quite similar;
with the panelists, however, the party complained against has
to select two panelists, who each must be a citizen of the
complaining parties, respectively.8 6 The complaining parties
then choose two panelists from the party against whom they are
complaining. Again, a system of lots is used if there is any
dispute.87 Unlike the WTO, where most panelists come from a
wide array of countries, the NAFTA has predominantly NAFTA
citizens as panelists (as assumed by the detailed rules) and has
thus devised a more complex system to ensure fairness.88
80. DSU, supra note 2, art. 8.2.
81. Id. art. 8.7.
82. Id.
83. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 2009(1).
84. Id. art. 2011.1(a)-(b).
85. Id. art. 2011.1(c).
86. Id. art. 2011.2(a)-(c).
87. Id. art. 2011.2(d).
88. When a dispute arises under Chapter 19, a panel of five members is
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After the panelists are chosen under the DSU rules, under
the agreed upon terms of reference, the panel is supposed to
complete its examination and report within six months,
consulting with both parties at least twice and seeking
information from any source it deems appropriate, including
consultation with an Expert Review Group.89 The NAFTA panel
has a similar information gathering system. Once the panelists
are chosen, the arbitral panel receives written and oral
testimony from the parties. In addition, on request by one of the
parties or by the panel's initiative, the panel may seek
information from outside experts "provided that the disputing
Parties so agree and subject to such terms and conditions as
such Parties may agree."90
In the WTO, after the panel has examined the written and
oral evidence of the parties to the dispute as well as third
parties that have been granted permission to make oral and
written submissions by the DSB and all multiple complainants,
it distributes the fact and argument sections of the report to the
parties for comments, and then subsequently issues the entire
selected from the national Roster lists. Each government in the dispute (through its
trade minister) appoints two panelists, in consultation with the other involved
government (Chapter 19 panels are always bi-national in composition). The fifth
panelist is from one of the two countries and generally alternates with each dispute.
Under Chapter 20, an arbitral panel is established using a reverse selection process.
Under this process, each disputing Party selects two panelists who are citizens of
the other disputing Party. The chair of the panel is selected by the disputing Parties
and may be a citizen of a NAFTA Party or any other country.
To serve on a specific panel, roster candidates must complete Disclosure
Statements pursuant to a NAFTA Code of Conduct. The Code is fundamental to the
process. The governing principle is that a roster candidate and panel member must
disclose any interest, relationship or matter that is likely to affect his/her
independence or impartiality or that might create an appearance of impropriety or
bias. NAFTA panelists and committee members are not permanent arbitrators, but
are established on ad hoc basis.
89. DSU, supra note 2, arts. 12, 13; App. 4. The Panel has nine months at the
longest to issue its report. Id. art. 12.9. And, it must complete its examination in
three months if the dispute relates to perishable goods. Id. art. 12.8.
90. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 2014; ABBOT, supra note 65, at 101. Note that
the DSU Article 13 provides that "[elach panel shall have the right to seek
information and technical advice from any individual or body which it deems
appropriate." DSU, supra note 2, art. 13 (Emphasis added). The Panel only needs to
"inform the authorities of [the] Member" if it is seeking information within the
Member's boundaries. Id. Otherwise, unlike under NAFTA, the Panels have a free
hand to seek information from whomever the Panelists wish without seeking the
consent of the Members. A similar consent system is used for Scientific Review
Boards which the panel or disputing party can request. NAFTA, supra note 8, art.
2015.
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interim report to the parties for comments once again.91 The
panel then issues a final report to the DSB, which then
circulates the report to all of the members and must adopt the
report within sixty days of issuance, unless one of the parties
indicates its intention to appeal or a consensus against adoption
is reached in the DSB.92 If the panel report is not appealed or
contested, the DSB adopts the panel report. If there is an
appeal, which either party can make, the case goes to the
standing Appellate Body (AB), which has seven permanent
members, three of whom sit on each case. The AB makes its
determinations purely on matters of law and must report its
findings to the DSB within sixty days, and in no case more than
ninety days. 93 The DSB must adopt the AB report within thirty
days contingent upon consensus in the DSB and both parties
must unconditionally accept the recommendations of the AB or
panel (where it is not appealed).94
In contrast, the NAFTA text sets different parameters for
the panel reports, provides for no formal adoption proceedings,
and has no provisions for appeal. Upon compiling the
information provided by the parties and any outside expert
advice, the panel must issue an initial report within ninety days
of the panel creation in which it must stipulate: a) findings of
fact, b) a determination on whether the measure at issue causes
nullification or impairment in the sections subject to Chapter
20's jurisdiction, and c) "recommendations, if any, for the
resolution of the dispute."95 The parties have the opportunity to
submit written comments within fourteen days of the issuance
of the report and the panel, having the opportunity to consider
the views of the parties or reconsider its report, shall issue the
final report within thirty days of the initial report, unless the
disputing parties agree otherwise.96
The parties may not appeal the final report because
Chapter 20 does not provide for appellate review, and the panel
does not issue a binding remedy on procedures through which to
91. DSU, supra note 2, arts. 15, 10.2, 9.2. With regards to multiple
complainants and third party complainants, they also have the right to receive
copies made by the other parties to the dispute. And, with multiple complainants,
they can request that the Panel present separate reports at the completion of the
investigation.
92. Id. art. 16.
93. Id. art. 17.
94. Id. arts. 16, 17.
95. NAFTA, supra note 8, 2016(2) (emphasis added).
96. Id. arts. 2016(4)-(5); 2017(1).
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solve the dispute. Instead, the parties, on the receipt of the final
report, are to "agree on the resolution of the dispute, which
normally shall conform with the determinations and
recommendations of the Panel"97 and have to notify the
secretariat of their agreed upon solution. The panel cannot
enforce its recommendations, nor does the Secretariat oversee
the implementation. In this respect, Abbot argues, "it is of
cardinal significance to the institutional structure of the NAFTA
that the Parties must agree on a resolution of a dispute after the
panel renders its decision." 98 Unlike in the WTO, the parties
bear the onus of negotiating a mutually acceptable solution
based on the panel report with minimal guidance from the
institutional structure, perhaps once again in deference to
sovereignty concerns.
The limited involvement of the NAFTA institutional
structure in determining the nature of the resolution of the
dispute is also reflected in the NAFTA post-adjudication
proceedings. While the NAFTA language lacks detail, the DSU
has very specific rules that the parties are required to follow.
At the DSB meeting held within thirty days of the adoption
of the AB/panel report, the party concerned must state its
intentions with regards to the implementation of the report.99 If
it is "impracticable to comply immediately," the Member "shall
have a reasonable period of time [RPT] in which to do so."100 The
RPT is defined in DSU Article 21.3 as:
(a) the period of time proposed by the Member concerned, provided
that such period is approved by the DSB; or in absence of such
approval,
(b) a period of time mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute
within 45 days after the date of adoption of the recommendations and
rulings; or, in the absence of such agreement,
(c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90
days after the date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings. In
such arbitration, a guideline for the arbitrator should be that the
[RPT] to implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations should
not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate
Body report. However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending
upon the particular circumstances.
97. Id. art. 2018(1).
98. Abbot, supra note 65, at 101.
99. DSU, supra note 2, art. 21.
100. Id.
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In cases where "there is disagreement as to the existence or
consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to
comply with the recommendations and rulings," the complaining
party has recourse to what is referred to as a "21.5 Panel,"
whereby the proposed implementation is referred to the original
panel for adjudication. 101 And, even though the DSU is silent on
appealing 21.5 Panel reports, the right was first identified in
Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft.10 2 As there is
no independent policing body responsible for enforcing the panel
and AB decisions, the DSB, composed of all WTO members, is
the supervisory body for surveillance and implementation; and,
the DSU provides that the "issue of implementation of the
recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the agenda of the
DSB meeting after six months following the date of
establishment of the [RPT]... and shall remain on the DSB's
agenda until the issue is resolved."1 0 3
In cases of non-implementation, the complaining party
must negotiate with the responding party in order to establish a
"mutually acceptable" level of compensation, typically conceived
of in terms of trade concessions. 10 4 If no satisfactory level has
been set within twenty days after the expiry of the RPT, the
complaining party may request authorization from the DSB to
suspend concessions 0 5 or obligations 10 6 to the other party under
101. Id. art. 21.5.
102. Panel Report, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999).
103. Marceau, supra note 5, at 531; DSU, supra note 2, art. 21.6.
104. DSU, supra note 2, art. 22.2.
105. 'WTO negotiations produce general rules that apply to all members, and
specific commitments made by individual member governments. The specific
commitments are listed in documents called 'schedules of concessions.' The
schedules reflect the 'concessions' a member has given in trade negotiations." WTO,
Schedules on Concessions of Goods,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/schedules-.e/goods-schedulese.htm (last visited
Sept. 24, 2006). For more information, see World Trade Organization, "Members'
Commitments," in
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/schedules-e/goods-schedules e.htm (last visited
March 28, 2005).
106. In the framework of trade in services, for example, obligations contained in
the GATS may be categorized into two groups: 1) general obligations which apply
directly and automatically to all Members, regardless of the existence of sectoral
commitments; and 2) specific commitments whose scope is limited to the sectors and
activities where a Member has decided to assume market access and national
treatment obligations. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. IX, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183 (1995) [hereinafter GATS]; GATS, supra, art. XVI. Obligations can also
be divided into unconditional and conditional obligations. Unconditional obligations
apply to all services except those not subject to coverage by the GATS. Examples of
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the agreement in question.10 7 And, the DSB should grant this
request within thirty days of the expiry of the RPT unless there
is a lack of consensus.108 If the party causing the injury disputes
the level of suspension granted by the DSB, it can request
arbitration either to be carried out by the original panel or by an
arbitrator appointed by the Director General: the "Article
22.6"109 arbitration should produce a final report within sixty
days of the expiry of the RPT.110 The DSB shall then, on request
by the complainant, authorize the suspension of concessions at
the level determined by the arbitrator, unless the DSB rejects
the request by consensus."1 While the DSB/arbitrator should
authorize the suspension of concessions in the same sector as
the issue in question, there are possibilities for cross-relation
with other sectors or other covered agreements if the suspension
is not "practicable or effective" in the same sector.1
2
It must be pointed out that the DSU specifically stipulates
that compensation and suspension of concessions must be
"temporary," and are methods not preferred to "full
implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into
unconditional obligations are the most-favored-nation treatment (except for those
listed in the Annex on Article II Exemptions) and certain transparency obligations,
whereas conditional obligations are Member-specific and contained in individual
Members' schedules of specific commitments. Id. arts. II, III. Conditional obligations
are assumed in a "bottom-up" or positive list approach. See id. appendix (containing
the schedules of specific commitments for each member country).
107. DSU, supra note 2, art. 22.2.
108. Id. art. 22.6.
109. DSU Article 22.6 reads:
When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs, the DSB, upon
request, shall grant authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of
time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.
However, if the Member concerned objects to the level of suspension
proposed, or claims that the principles and procedures set forth in
paragraph 3 have not been followed where a complaining party has
requested authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations
pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be referred to
arbitration. Such arbitration shall be carried out by the original panel,
if members are available, or by an arbitrator [the expression
"arbitrator" shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or
a group] appointed by the Director-General and shall be completed
within 60 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of
time. Concessions or other obligations shall not be suspended during
the course of the arbitration.
Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. art. 22.7.
112. Id. art. 22.3.
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conformity with the covered agreements. " 113 Most importantly,
"[c]ompensation [by the losing party] is voluntary, and, if
granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements. "114
Although the WTO does not have legal powers per se to enforce
the rulings, the sanction possibilities seek to chastise the
Members breaching the WTO or other covered agreements. 1 5
The compliance power of the WTO rests on the moral force of its
rulings, the strength of the Member adopting the retaliation,
and the diplomatic pressure exerted by the parties to the case as
well as the WTO Members compositely." 6 Drawing from the
history of the WTO dispute settlement system discussed above,
while the political will to undertake the WTO legal obligations
might be very strong for the losing party, whether the Member
will ultimately comply with the ruling depends on its political
will in the dispute at hand.
The NAFTA post-arbitral proceedings reflect the bilateral,
negotiation-based underpinnings of the Chapter 20. NAFTA
Article 2018 states that the best possible resolution is non-
implementation or removal of a measure which the panel has
determined has caused nullification or impairment of the
complaining Party's NAFTA obligations, or "failing such a
resolution, compensation."" 7 However, if:
the Party complaineq against has not reached agreement with any
complaining Party on a mutually satisfactory resolution pursuant to
Article 2018(1) within 30 days of receiving the final report, such
complaining party may suspend the application to the Party
complained against of benefits of equivalent effect until such time as
they have reached agreement on a resolution of the dispute. 118
Unlike the WTO system of RPT for compliance, NAFTA
provides thirty days for the losing party to implement a
solution. However, thirty days is an impracticable period of time
for implementation. The idea is to get together with the other
side to work things out if the other side is acting in good faith.
The NAFTA system shifts the burden to the losing defendant
and it depends on that party's good faith. Since retaliation is not
good for both countries, it does not make sense to retaliate if
there is no implementation even if, within thirty days, the other
113. Id. art. 22.1.
114. DSU, supra note 2, art. 22.1
115. AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 43, at 68-69.
116. Id. at 69.
117. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 2018.
118. Id. art. 2019(1) (emphasis added).
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
side is trying to comply in good faith.
If the losing respondent fails to comply or make an
adequate showing of good faith, the aggrieved party can suspend
concessions in the same sector as the trade measure at issue or
"a complaining party that considers it is not practicable or
effective to suspend benefits in the same sector or sectors may
suspend benefits in other sectors."119 The NAFTA, like the DSU,
provides for cross-sector retaliation, but the guidelines provided
for the parties to implement the retaliation contain little detail.
And, finally, if any of the disputing parties believe that the level
of benefits suspended is "manifestly excessive," 120 the party has
the right to request the Commission to establish a panel which
needs to present its determination within sixty days after the
last panelist is selected or by which time the parties stipulate.
The NAFTA text provides no further guidance to the parties,
suggesting that the parties may need to pursue diplomatic
channels if the dispute is not resolved by that point.
C. DIAGNOSIS
Part I began with an examination of the evolution of the
WTO dispute settlement system from one of the loose rules
under the GATT, which nevertheless functioned effectively, to
the detailed, rule-based system now present. Hudec underplays
the novelty of the new system, suggesting that the political will
behind the institution, and not the rules themselves, ensures
that an organization functions well. The NAFTA system, also
discussed above, perhaps can be compared with the old
negotiation-, diplomatic-based GATT system supported by the
political will of the United States, Canada, and Mexico to have a
strong legal system in a regional context. Does the empirical
evidence support these arguments?
According to Hudec:
[Ihf it is true that the key ingredient of international legal systems is
the political will of member governments to comply with them, and if it
is also true that the WTO legal reforms do not signal a sudden
improvement in the less-than-perfect political will that caused the
GATT legal system to suffer occasional failures, it follows that the new
WTO legal system cannot expect to have one hundred percent
compliance, even with its new and more rigorous procedures. To the
contrary, it must be anticipated that there will be defeats when
governments cannot, or will not, comply with some legal rulings -just
119. Id. art. 2019(2)(b).
120. Id. art. 2019(3).
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as they did under GATT.
12 1
The empirical evidence seems to suggest the accuracy of
Hudec's assertion. Of the sixty-eight complaints resolved
through panel or Appellate Body reports from 1995 to 2001,
roughly thirteen cases have entered DSU Articles 21122 or 22123
121. Hudec, supra note 6, at 14.
122. DSU Article 21 reads:
1. Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB
is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the
benefit of all Members.
2. Particular attention should be paid to matters affecting the
interests of developing country Members with respect to measures
which have been subject to dispute settlement.
3. At a DSB meeting held within 30 days [If a meeting of the DSB
is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the DSB shall
be held for this purpose] after the date of adoption of the panel or
Appellate Body report, the Member concerned shall inform the DSB
of its intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB. If it is impracticable to comply immediately
with the recommendations and rulings, the Member concerned shall
have a reasonable period of time in which to do so. The reasonable
period of time shall be:
(a) the period of time proposed by the Member concerned, provided
that such period is approved by the DSB; or, in the absence of such
approval,
(b) a period of time mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute
within 45 days after the date of adoption of the recommendations and
rulings; or, in the absence of such agreement,
(c) a period of time determined through binding arbitration within 90
days after the date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings
[If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator within ten days after
referring the matter to arbitration, the arbitrator shall be appointed by
the Director-General within ten days, after consulting the parties]. In
such arbitration, a guideline for the arbitrator [The expression
"arbitrator" shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or
a group] should be that the reasonable period of time to implement
panel or Appellate Body recommendations should not exceed 15
months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body
report. However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon
the particular circumstances.
4. Except where the panel or the Appellate Body has extended,
pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article 12 or paragraph 5 of Article 17, the
time of providing its report, the period from the date of establishment
of the panel by the DSB until the date of determination of the
reasonable period of time shall not exceed 15 months unless the
parties to the dispute agree otherwise. Where either the panel or the
Appellate Body has acted to extend the time of providing its report,
the additional time taken shall be added to the 15-month period;
provided that unless the parties to the dispute agree that there are
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exceptional circumstances, the total time shall not exceed 18 months.
5. Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency
with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through
recourse to these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever
possible resort to the original panel. The panel shall circulate its
report within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to it.
When the panel considers that it cannot provide its report within this
time frame, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the
delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will
submit its report.
6. The DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation of
adopted recommendations or rulings. The issue of implementation of
the recommendations or rulings may be raised at the DSB by any
Member at any time following their adoption. Unless the DSB
decides otherwise, the issue of implementation of the
recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB
meeting after six months following the date of establishment of the
reasonable period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and shall remain
on the DSB's agenda until the issue is resolved. At least 10 days
prior to each such DSB meeting, the Member concerned shall provide
the DSB with a status report in writing of its progress in the
implementation of the recommendations or rulings.
7. If the matter is one which has been raised by a developing
country Member, the DSB shall consider what further action it might
take which would be appropriate to the circumstances.
8. If the case is one brought by a developing country Member, in
considering what appropriate action might be taken, the DSB shall
take into account not only the trade coverage of measures complained
of, but also their impact on the economy of developing country
Members concerned.
DSU, supra note 2, art. 21.
123. DSU Article 22 reads:
1. Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other
obligations are temporary measures available in the event that the
recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a
reasonable period of time. However, neither compensation nor the
suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full
implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into
conformity with the covered agreements. Compensation is voluntary
and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements.
2. If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be
inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance therewith or
otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings within the
reasonable period of time determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of
Article 21, such Member shall, if so requested, and no later than the
expiry of the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with
any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a
view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. If no
satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the
date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party having
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invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization
from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.
3. In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend,
the complaining party shall apply the following principles and
procedures:
(a) the general principle is that the complaining party should first
seek to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the
same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate Body has found
a violation or other nullification or impairment;
(b) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to
suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same
sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in
other sectors under the same agreement;
(c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to
suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to other sectors
under the same agreement, and that the circumstances are serious
enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations
under another covered agreement;
(d) in applying the above principles, that party shall take into
account:
(i) the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the
panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification
or impairment, and the importance of such trade to that party;
(ii) the broader economic elements related to the nullification or
impairment and the broader economic consequences of the
suspension of concessions or other obligations;
(e) if that party decides to request authorization to suspend
concessions or other obligations pursuant to subparagraphs (b) or (c),
it shall state the reasons therefor in its request. At the same time as
the request is forwarded to the DSB, it also shall be forwarded to the
relevant Councils and also, in the case of a request pursuant to
subparagraph (b), the relevant sectoral bodies;
(f) for purposes of this paragraph, "sector" means:
(i) with respect to goods, all goods;
(ii) with respect to services, a principal sector as identified in the
current "Services Sectoral Classification List" which identifies such
sectors; [The list in document MTN.GNS/W/120 identifies eleven
sectors]
(iii) with respect to trade-related intellectual property rights, each
of the categories of intellectual property rights covered in Section 1,
or Section 2, or Section 3, or Section 4, or Section 5, or Section 6, or
Section 7 of Part II, or the obligations under Part III, or Part IV of the
Agreement on TRIPS;
(g) for purposes of this paragraph, "agreement" means:
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(i) with respect to goods, the agreements listed in Annex IA of the
WTO Agreement, taken as a whole as well as the Plurilateral Trade
Agreements in so far as the relevant parties to the dispute are parties
to these agreements;
(ii) with respect to services, the GATS;
(iii) with respect to intellectual property rights, the Agreement on
TRIPS.
4. The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations
authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the
nullification or impairment.
5. The DSB shall not authorize suspension of concessions or other
obligations if a covered agreement prohibits such suspension.
6. When the situation described in paragraph 2 occurs, the DSB,
upon request, shall grant authorization to suspend concessions or
other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable
period of time unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the
request. However, if'the Member concerned objects to the level of
suspension proposed, or claims that the principles and procedures set
forth in paragraph 3 have not been followed where a complaining
party has requested authorization to suspend concessions or other
obligations pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be
referred to arbitration. Such arbitration shall be carried out by the
original panel, if members are available, or by an arbitrator [the
expression "arbitrator" shall be interpreted as referring either to an
individual or a group] appointed by the Director-General and shall be
completed within 60 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable
period of time. Concessions or other obligations shall not be
suspended during the course of the arbitration.
7. The arbitrator [the expression "arbitrator" shall be interpreted as
referring either to an individual or a group or to the members of the
original panel when serving in the capacity of arbitrator] acting
pursuant to paragraph 6 shall not examine the nature of the
concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine
whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of
nullification or impairment. The arbitrator may also determine if the
proposed suspension of concessions or other obligations is allowed
under the covered agreement. However, if the matter referred to
arbitration includes a claim that the principles and procedures set
forth in paragraph 3 have not been followed, the arbitrator shall
examine that claim. In the event the arbitrator determines that those
principles and procedures have not been followed, the complaining
party shall apply them consistent with paragraph 3. The parties shall
accept the arbitrator's decision as final and the parties concerned shall
not seek a second arbitration. The DSB shall be informed promptly
of the decision of the arbitrator and shall upon request, grant
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations where the
request is consistent with the decision of the arbitrator, unless the
DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.
8. The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be
temporary and shall only be applied until such time as the measure
[Vol. 16:1
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proceedings. Two of the most prominent of such cases have been
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale, and
Distribution of Bananas (Bananas) 124 and European
Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones).125 In Bananas, the United States, Ecuador,
Guatemala, and Honduras successfully challenged the EC-wide
regime for bananas created in 1993.126 The regime discriminated
against Latin American bananas (and, thus, U.S. companies)
and instead favored bananas from EC domestic producers and
from the ACP, given special trade preferences under the
traditional preferential arrangement, the Lom6 Convention. 127
Because of the political sensitivity of the issue, the EC failed to
comply with the WTO panel decision recommending that it
bring its regime into compliance with WTO rules, and instead
faced $191.4 million worth of 100% ad valorem duties by the
found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed,
or the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings
provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a
mutually satisfactory solution is reached. In accordance with
paragraph 6 of Article 21, the DSB shall continue to keep under
surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or
rulings, including those cases where compensation has been provided
or concessions or other obligations have been suspended but the
recommendations to bring a measure into conformity with the
covered agreements have not been implemented.
9. The dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements may
be invoked in respect of measures affecting their observance taken by
regional or local governments or authorities within the territory of a
Member. When the DSB has ruled that a provision of a covered
agreement has not been observed, the responsible Member shall take
such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure its
observance. The provisions of the covered agreements and this
Understanding relating to compensation and suspension of
concessions or other obligations apply in cases where it has not been
possible to secure such observance. [Where the provisions of any
covered agreement concerning measures taken by regional or local
governments or authorities within the territory of a Member contain
provisions different from the provisions of this paragraph, the
provisions of such covered agreement shall prevail]
Id. art. 22, at 126-128
124. WT/DS27 (5 Feb. 1996).
125. WT/DS26 (26 Jan. 1996).
126. Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador,
WT/DS27/RWiECU (12 April 1999).
127. The Lome Convention links African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP)
developing countries to the EC. See generally European Economic Community-
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Counties: Documents from Lom6 Meeting, Feb. 28,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 595.
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United States on products such as handbags and electric coffee
makers. It was not until April 2001 that the United States and
the EC agreed to a settlement whereby the EC would bring its
regime into compliance by 2006. Assuming that the EC does
follow through on the agreement, this dispute, rife with
noncompliance, will have lasted over thirteen years.
The Hormones case, which began in 1998 and still has not
been resolved, 128 concerns public health and agriculture policy
issues. The dispute, over the use of growth hormones in the U.S.
and Canadian beef industry, has seen no efforts by the EC to
open its market to U.S. and Canadian beef, despite a successful
challenge of the EC hormone-ban at the WTO. Again, due to the
political sensitivity of the issue in Europe, the EC has had to
bear $116.8 million of U.S. retaliatory tariffs as its price for
noncompliance.
Until 2001, in the North American context, there had been
two cases of compliance difficulties. The first is Canada -
Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation
of Dairy Products.129 This dispute over Canada's system of
government support for domestic milk production and export,
and tariff rate quota regime for exports of fluid milk was
brought jointly by New Zealand and the United States in 1999.
The Panel ruled against Canada and determined Canada
needed to bring its regime into conformity within the reasonable
period of fifteen months and four days. However, the United
States and New Zealand took Canada to an Article 21.5 Panel
for failing to comply with the DSB's recommendation as well as
an Article 21.5 Appeal which just issued its report in December
2001. The importance of the agricultural sector in Canada, in
this case the dairy industry, has made adequate compliance
very difficult and perhaps assures that the dispute will not be
resolved quickly.
The second dispute is Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation
of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States.130
Just as in Canada - Dairy,131 the Mexico - Corn Syrup dispute
128. It is interesting to note though, that although the WTO claims to be a
transparent and open institution, the Hormones case was the first Panel dispute
proceeding in the history of the WTO to be open to the general public at the WTO
headquarters in September 2005.
129. WT/DS113 (29 Dec. 1997) (New Zealand) and WT/DS103 (U.S.) (8 Oct.
1997) [Hereinafter Canada-Dairy].
130. WT/DS132 (8 May 1998) [Hereinafter Mexico--Corn Syrup].
131. Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of
Dairy Products, WT/DS103 (8 Oct. 1997).
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has gone through DSB Panel proceedings, a 21.5 Panel, and
finally an appeal of the 21.5 Panel decision. 132 The dispute
concerns a 1997 Mexican anti-dumping investigation of HFCS
which led to anti-dumping duties on U.S. exports to Mexico. The
United States successfully challenged the anti-dumping
determination in early 2000 at the WTO, but as of 2001 Mexico
had not yet fully complied with the Panel's recommendations. In
fact, this dispute has spawned a NAFTA Chapter 19 panel
through which U.S. private industry has challenged the
Mexican HFCS anti-dumping determinations. 133 This seems also
to have been a very politically sensitive issue in Mexico as,
interestingly, in two of the NAFTA Chapter 20 decisions
discussed below, Mexico threatened retaliation of higher tariffs
on HFCS." 4 Insufficient compliance in this case may be used as
a bargaining tool by Mexico to gain market access to the U.S.
market for Mexican sugar. 135
These four WTO cases (EC - Bananas III; EC - Hormones;
Canada - Dairy; and Mexico - Corn Syrup) are just a few of the
politically sensitive cases that Hudec suggests would spark
instances of noncompliance. The United States, EC, Canada,
and Mexico seem to have very strong political will to comply
with the legal obligations of the WTO and to pursue free
trade. 3 6 Thus, the politically sensitive cases appear to be those
132. The initial panel proceeding, however, was never appealed to the AB.
133. High Fructose Corn Syrup from the USA, (MEX-USA-98-1904-01); Review
of the Final Determination of the Antidumping Investigation on Imports of High
Fructose Corn Syrup, Originating from the United States of America, available at
http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/app/DocRepository/1lDispute/english/NAFTA Chapter_19/Mexico/ma9810
le.pdf (last visited Sep. 15, 2006).
134. Mexico targeted the U.S. HFCS industry in its retaliation for the NAFTA
Chapter 20 Broom Corn Dispute. Clinton Lifts Broomcorn Safeguard: Mexico Will
Drop Retaliation, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, December 11, 1998, at 9.. Mexico also
threatened retaliation against the U.S. HFCS industry in the Mexican Trucking
Dispute. Senators Continue to Dispute NAFTA Trucking Language in Spending Bill,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 27, 2001, at 8.
135. Mexico, U.S. Handle HFCS Dispute, as Mexico Presses on Sugar Access,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, December 21, 2001, at 1.
136. This is particularly apparent with the successful launching of trade talks at
the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001. In 2001 in Doha (Qatar), a
promise was given to developing countries, namely their inclusion in the world
trading system, in order to achieve a higher level of justice and equity in the world.
That is why the new round is called the "development agenda." The argument is that
a more open and equitable trading system brings more peace to the world and, in
this sense, the Doha Development Agenda should not be approached as a zero-sum
game -as many developing countries seem to perceive it-, but as a win-win situation.
Mr. Mandelson, who referred to a development package for least-developed countries
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instances of "less-than-perfect political will" that Hudec
describes.137
There are no detailed statistics for the NAFTA Chapter 20
system as there have been only three completed disputes
between 1994 and 2001. The first case, Canadian Agricultural
Products,138 required no compliance measures since it was a
negative ruling. There, in 1996, the United States
unsuccessfully challenged Canada's increase of over-quota tariff
duties on certain agricultural products as a result of tariffication
under the WTO Agriculture Agreement.
The second case, Broomcorn,139 also arose in 1996, and was
a dispute over the use of a global safeguard measures by the
United States. The U.S. broomcorn broom industry filed a
safeguard petition under §202 of the 1974 Trade Act as well as
under the NAFTA Implementation Act. While the United States
International Trade Commission (USITC)140 determined that
both global and NAFTA imports were causing injury, the
President decided to take action only in the global safeguards
case and imposed a safeguard through December 1999.
Although Honduras and Colombia were also affected by the
safeguard action, Mexico imposed a 20% duty on U.S. exports of
wine, wine coolers, brandy, Tennessee whiskey, fructose,
notebooks, flat glass, and wooden furniture legally under the
WTO Agreement on Safeguards. 41 Mexico also brought a
NAFTA Chapter 20 case in 1998 claiming that the U.S.
safeguard violated its NAFTA obligations. The Panel agreed
with Mexico, but the United States did not lift the safeguard
immediately. Instead, after the ruling, the U.S. Trade
(LDCs) as 'indispensable,' indicated at the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference
that the EU had committed to step up annual spending on aid for trade to EUR 2
billion by 2010. One billion of this will come from EU Member States, which agreed
at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference to the increase (from EUR 400 million per
year); the remainder will come from the European Commission. "Europe did not
come to Hong Kong empty-handed on aid for trade," he said. Lamy Calls on WTO
Economies to "Take Risks"for Gains, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, Dec. 13, 2005.
137. Hudec, supra note 6, at 14.
138. Canadian Agricultural Products, supra note 15.
139. Broomcorn, supra note 15.
140. The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) is an
independent, non-partisan, quasi-judicial, federal agency of the United States that
provides trade expertise to both the legislative and executive branches. Further, the
agency determines the impact of imports on U.S. industries, and directs actions
against certain unfair trade practices, such as dumping (pricing policy), patent,
trademark, and copyright infringement.
141. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 8, 1869 U.N.T.S. 157 (1998).
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Representative requested a study from the USITC to determine
whether the U.S. broomcorn industry had been positively
affected after the safeguard had been imposed. Mexico, however,
"[did] not [say it] ... would retaliate"142 in response to the study.
This is probably because the United States was making a good
faith attempt to comply with the ruling, a very important facet
to the compliance phase of the NAFTA system. Six months later,
in December 1998, the USITC study determined that the U.S.
broomcorn broom industry was not making the necessary
adjustment while the tariffs were in place. This led to the
decision by the Clinton Administration to remove the safeguard
early. 143 The U.S. broomcorn broom industry, however, blamed
the lifting of the safeguard "on political pressure . . .from the
much larger companies that were subject to the [initial]
retaliation."14 Whatever the grounding of the political will, it
was sufficient to make the United States comply with the
NAFTA panel report nine months after it was issued.
The third, more recent dispute, Trucking,145 concerned U.S.
laws restricting Mexican firms from providing trucking services
in the United States, or even investing in the U.S. trucking
industry. Under Annex 1 of the NAFTA, the United States had
to phase out the reservation it had taken for cross-border
trucking services by December 1995, but the Clinton
Administration failed to fulfill the NAFTA obligations, citing
security concerns. Mexico successfully challenged the U.S.
moratorium through a Chapter 20 Panel, which found the
United States in violation of its NAFTA obligations. As soon as
the report was issued, the Bush Administration was much more
willing to come to a resolution of the dispute than the Clinton
Administration had been. 46 Thus, Mexican trade officials
indicated that "Mexico would not seek to retaliate right away if
the U.S. did not bring itself into full compliance with the panel's
finding after 30 days, as would be [Mexico's] right under NAFTA
dispute settlement procedures." 47 "Here we are looking at a
142. Barshefsky Sidesteps Direct Response to NAFTA Panel on Mexican Brooms,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 15, 1998, at 21.
143. Clinton Lifts Broomcorn Safeguard; Mexico Will Drop Retaliation, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Dec., 1998, at 9.
144. Id.
145. Trucking, supra note 15.
146. Bush Administration Begins Discussion on Implementing Truck Panel,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 16, 2001, at 8.
147. U.S. Faces Constraints in Implementing NAFTA Truck Panel, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 9, 2001.
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U.S. Administration," said a Mexican trade official, "that has
said it would fulfill its NAFTA obligations. Our expectation is
that they will comply and we expect to be satisfied."148 The Bush
Administration put forward its proposal to allow limited entry
to Mexican trucking firms into the United States by early 2002,
beginning with expanded access in border "commercial zones."1 49
The Administration, however, faced steep opposition to the plan
in Congress through the summer of 2001. It was not until
November 28, 2001 that Congress and the President were able
to come to a mutually acceptable agreement on the matter.
While it is unclear whether the borders were opened as of
January 1, 2002, the legislation has set a definitive timetable
within which the United States will be in compliance with its
NAFTA obligations. 150
There are a few interesting facets to this dispute. First,
despite the nine month delay in action, the Mexican government
never imposed retaliatory measures on the United States. As in
the Broomcorn dispute, the Administration's good faith efforts
were sufficient to assuage Mexico's concerns and prevent
retaliation. Second, the United States passed legislation to
comply despite the many security concerns surrounding the
entry of Mexican trucks into the United States. This was a very
high political hurdle for the Administration and Congress,
particularly in light of security concerns in the aftermath of the
September 11 tragedies. Third, James Hoffa of the Teamsters
was a very vocal opponent of U.S. compliance with the NAFTA
panel. He published a report in which he argued:
even if [the United States'] actions as a result of legislation were found
to violate the NAFTA, the cost to the U.S. would be small. Possible
retaliation from Mexico would be limited to the amount of lost business
due to the restrictions [i.e., less border traffic flow because of security
concerns], which is already limited due to border congestion. 151
Mr. Hoffa actually quantified U.S. noncompliance at $225
million. 5 2 If the costs of noncompliance were really that low, the
outcome of this case perhaps shows the strong political will of
the United States to resolve this dispute.
148. Id.
149. U.S. Plan would open Territory to Mexican Trucks Starting in 2002, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Mar. 30, 2001, at 3.
150. Congress Strikes a Deal on NAFTA Trucks Supported by White House,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, November 30, 2001, at 7.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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Overall, it seems that compliance with Chapter 20 Panel
reports has been good, but extended. Hudec's proposition seems
to apply here as well - the NAFTA has a limited system of rules,
yet there has been compliance in politically sensitive issues. In
examining both the WTO and the NAFTA cases, institutions,
and background, it has become all the more apparent that the
rules of the systems are made effective by their political
underpinnings.
II. COMPARISON
Because of the political nature of WTO and NAFTA
disputes, the rules yield benefits and drawbacks for parties
involved in each system. This section will look at some factors
that determine the effectiveness of the system by examining
each of the potential advantages and disadvantages from the
perspective of the winning and losing parties.
A. WTO
1. Advantages
a. Losing Respondent
While the losing party is constrained by the detailed series
of rules under the DSU, one advantage of the system is that it
has a variety of ways to prolong noncompliance. After the nine
months it customarily takes for the adoption of the first panel
report, the party can first appeal the decision, adding an extra
three months to the process. 153 Second, following the appeal, if
the party loses once again and must implement the AB decision,
it can try to prolong the RPT by proposing or negotiating a
period of time with the other Member or going to arbitration to
seek up to fifteen months (a guideline for the maximum period
of time) for implementation. 154 Third, the party need not de jure
comply and can instead send de facto implementation
procedures to the DSB, which is supposed to supervise
implementation. Fourth, the losing party could face a 21.5 panel
for insufficient implementation and, fifth, if ruled against, it can
153. DSU, supra note 2, art. 20.
154. Id. 21.3(c).
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try to appeal the 21.5 ruling to the AB. 15 5 Sixth, after the 21.5
rulings, the party can still postpone implementation and face
the DSU Article 22 compensation proceedings. 15 6 Seventh, the
party can disagree with the other Member's level of
compensation and can request arbitration under Article 22.6,
which adds an additional period of time after the expiry of the
RPT.157 It is only then that the winning party may suspend
concessions and pursue retaliation. Since compensation appears
not to be retroactive under the DSU and is only prospective, a
losing party has all the possibilities under this system to
prolong non-compliance.
This sequence of events was the case in Bananas, discussed
above, which began under the GATT dispute settlement system
in 1993. The WTO panel, which issued its report in May 1997,
ruled that the EC's banana regime violated WTO rules on
sixteen counts. 158 The EC appealed all parts of the panel
decision in July 1997;159 the complainants cross-appealed on
three points.160 On September 9, 1997, the Appellate Body
issued its report upholding all parts of the initial ruling and also
reversing two of the cross-appealed opinions in favor of the
complainants.161
The WTO DSB adopted the reports on September 27, 1997,
recommending that the EC bring its regime into compliance
155. Id. art. 21.5. As discussed in the text supra, appealing 21.5 Panel decisions
is a subject on which the WTO treaty is silent. Because the treaty has not explicitly
prohibited the appeal, the treaty has been interpreted to allow appeals of 21.5 panel
proceedings to the original Panelists of the AB who heard the case on appeal. The
first case of this was in the Panel on Brazil - Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft (WT/DS46).
156. Id. art. 22.
157. Id. art. 22.6.
158. Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale,
and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/RJUSA, 393-397 (May 22, 1997).
159. Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities, European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/9, (June 13, 1997).
160. Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States, "European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas,"
Appeal of Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States under Rule
23 (1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, 26 June 1997, 2-3; Appellate
Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (9 Sept. 1997).
161. USTR, Notice of Determinations, Termination, and Monitoring,
"Determination Under 304 of Trade Act of 1974: European Communities' Banana
Regime," Federal Register 63, No. 32 (18 February 1998): 8248; Appellate Body
Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
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with the WTO. 162 On October 16, 1997, the EC stated that it
would "fully respect its international obligations with regard to
this matter," but would require a "reasonable period of time to
do so."163 On December 17, 1997, the WTO Arbitrator, at a
hearing requested by the complainants, granted the EC a
"reasonable period of time" under Article 21.3 of the DSU, until
January 1, 1999, to comply with the WTO ruling. 16 4
The EC made some attempts to comply in 1998, but the
proposals were WTO-inconsistent and the EC did not change its
regime by the January 1, 1999 deadline. The United States
informed the DSB on January 14 that it intended to suspend
concessions to the EC on trade worth $520 million in harm to
U.S. commerce. 65 The EC objected to the level of tariffs that
the United States had requested, and exercised its right under
Article 22.3 of the DSU. 166 On April 6, 1999, the DSU ruled that
the United States could suspend concessions for the amount of
$191.4 million in lost U.S. exports of goods and services. 67 The
DSB formally authorized the United States to begin its
retaliation on April 19, 1999.168 The United States instated
162. Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA, 393-397 (May 22, 1997) (adopted
Sept. 27, 1997); Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997)
(adopted Sept. 27, 1997).
163. Determination Under 304 of Trade Act of 1974: European Communities'
Banana Regime, 63 Fed. Reg. 32, 8248 (Feb. 18, 1998).
164. Award of Arbitrator, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/15 (Jan. 7, 1998).
165. Recourse by the United States to Article 22.2 of the DSU, European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/43 (Jan. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Recourse by U.S.]; USTR, "United States to
Apply Its WTO Retaliatory Rights in Banana Case," USTR Press Release, January
14, 1999. For the story of EC attempts at compliance see: Status Report of the
European Communities, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/17 (July 13, 1998); Status Report by the
European Communities - Addendum, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/17/Add.1 (Sept. 9, 1998);
Status Report by the European Communities - Addendum, European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, (Oct.
9, 1998); Status Report by the European Communities - Addendum, European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/17/Add.3 (Nov. 13, 1998).
166. Request by the European Communities for Arbitration under Article 22.6 of
the DSU, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/46 (Feb. 3, 1999).
167. Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB, (April 9, 1999).
168. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive
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100% ad valorem duties on handbags, types of paper,
lithographs, paperboard, bed linen, lead-acid storage batteries,
domestic electric coffee -makers (except those from Italy), and
bath products from all EU countries (except the Netherlands
and Denmark).169 The tariffs remained until July 2001, when
the then-U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Robert
Zoellick and the former EU trade commissioner Pascal Lamy
negotiated a bilateral resolution. 170 The EC has not yet brought
its banana regime into conformity despite all of these
proceedings, but it has plans to implement some changes by
2006.171
A second advantage to a losing respondent in the WTO
system relates to retaliatory measures by the aggrieved party.
There may be cases in which the dollar amount of the
retaliation authorized by the DSB might be relatively small or
the non-complying party can provide assistance to domestic
interests hurt by the ruling. Where the quantified costs of
noncompliance are small while the compliance measures that
need to be enacted in order to be in compliance are politically
costly, there may be no compliance at all. 172 An example of this
scenario is the Hormones case discussed above. While the
European beef ban might be pure protectionism at its roots,
even U.S. government and beef industry officials understand
that consumer concerns are very real given the bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), 173 or mad cow disease, and
Belgian dioxin scares in the past few years. Because of the BSE
crisis, beef consumption in Europe was overall down by 40%
around 2000-2001, which put strong pressure on the EU's
Office of the President, WTO Authorizes U.S. Retaliation, (April 19, 1999).
169. Recourse by U.S., supra note 165.
170. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, European Communities-Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/58 (July 2, 2001).
171. Status Report by the European Communities - Addendum, European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/51/Add. 25 (Jan. 21, 2002).
172. See supra text in which Mr. Hoffa of the Teamsters unsuccessfully made
this argument for noncompliance in the Mexican Trucking case under NAFTA. See
Congress Strikes Deal, supra note 147, at 8.
173. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as mad cow
disease, is a fatal, neurodegenerative disease of cattle, which infects by a mechanism
that surprised biologists on its discovery in the late XX century. While never having
killed cattle on a scale comparable to other dreaded livestock diseases, such as foot
and mouth and rinderpest, BSE has attracted wide attention because it seems that
people can contract the disease; it is thought to be the cause of variant Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease (vCJD), sometimes called new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(nvCJD), a human brain-wasting disease.
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Common Agriculture Policy and reduced the likelihood that the
ban would be lifted. 174 Thus, as the EC has not found the
sufficient domestic impetus to comply with the WTO ruling, it
has chosen to bear the retaliatory tariffs imposed by the United
States with authorization of the DSB.
Third, conversely, it might also be in a losing party's
interest to comply with panel and AB reports to strengthen the
credibility of the institution and set, to some degree, some kind
of international precedent for its own future dealings. For
example, in U.S. - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products,175 which the United States lost, the United
States may have wanted to comply with the AB reports in order
to set an example for cases in which it was the winning party
and had to enforce the case against another member. Canada
may want to set a similar precedent by complying with the
Canada - Term of Patent Protection case. 176 In this case, brought
by the United States, the AB found Canada's Patent Act was in
violation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS)177 because there were some cases
in which Canada only provided seventeen years of protection for
patents, whereas the TRIPS Agreement stipulates a twenty-
174. Rise of Mad Cow Disease in France Causes Panic, GUELPH MERCURY
(Ontario, Canada), Nov. 16, 2000, at A12.
175. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
176. Appellate Body Report, Canada-Term of Patent Protection,
WT/DS170/AB/R (Sept 18, 2000).
177. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade--Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [
hereinafter TRIPS]. The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Measures (TRIPS) is a Uruguay Round Agreement that extends WTO disciplines
into the protection of patents, trademarks, copyrights, geographical indications,
industrial designs, and trade secrets. Unlike most WTO rules, the TRIPS Agreement
requires both domestic enforcement and border measures as part of a member's
compliance to prevent piracy and other violations. Developing countries were given
longer transition periods for the phase-in of the TRIPS Agreement requirements.
The WTO (but also the North American Free Trade Agreement -NAFTA- and the
Free Trade Area of the Americas -FTAA-) includes new intellectual property rules
which require signatory countries to establish specific patent, copyright and
trademark protections in their domestic laws. The pharmaceutical industry
exercised heavy influence on WTO negotiations, and these agreements require
countries to adopt U.S.-style intellectual property laws, such as granting monopoly
sales rights to individual patent holders for extended time periods and including
seeds, medicines and other traditionally excluded items as those for which countries
must provide patent protections. The TRIPS rules have been subject of a major
international fight regarding poor countries' rights to issue compulsory licenses for
essential medicines.
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year minimum. Canada's prompt compliance with this ruling
should set a strong precedent for the developing world to comply
with the TRIPS Agreement and the reports of future panels
established concerning the TRIPS issues. This argument of
'example' can hold good for countries with large or small
amounts of bargaining power.
b. Winning Complainant
While there are certainly problems with achieving
compliance among members in difficult cases, the WTO provides
a detailed, systematic framework whereby the winning party's
position vis-a-vis the losing party is bolstered by the credibility
of the WTO, a respected international institution to which
Members have submitted themselves to jurisdiction. By having
the DSB administer the compliance and having the force of the
organization behind the winning party through an adopted
panel or AB report, the winning Member can take the
diplomatic high ground in demanding compliance with the
ruling.
This diplomatic pressure, combined with a rule-based
approach, gives opportunities for the winning party to receive
some sort of compensation. This system gives legitimacy to
winning parties to demand compliance within the time-frame
stipulated by the rulings as well as to suspend concessions and
retaliate against the party in noncompliance with the
authorization of the DSB. Although the dollar amounts of the
retaliation may be, in some cases, relatively small amounts like
in Bananas and Hormones, diplomatically, any amount of
retaliation has an important political effect with minimal trade
effects. It should be remembered that while the political
tensions remained high over the banana and beef disputes, the
retaliation amounts were, respectively, less than U.S.-EC trade
in a morning of most business days. And, in cases where the
amounts of potential retaliation are significant, as in the U.S. -
FSC case, 178 where there is potential for $4 billion retaliation by
the EC against the United States, the rule-oriented approach
ensures that the aggrieved party eventually has recourse to
retaliation even if there is no mutually agreed upon diplomatic
solution.
The winning party has means of receiving its compensation
178. United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporation," WT/DS108
(18 Nov. 1997).
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through retaliation. If the non-compliant party's same sector is
not practicable or effective to provide the adequate
compensation to the winning party, DSU Article 22.3 permits
the use of cross sector retaliation. Or, in cases where this is not
practicable or effective as well, DSU Article 22.3 provides for
"suspension of concessions or other obligations under another
covered agreement." This is yet more insurance for the
complaining party that it will receive some type of relief when it
successfully challenges trade practices which are deemed WTO-
incompatible.
The rule-oriented system is also a power-equalizing force
within the organization and helps Members who have a
relatively weaker position within the international system to
have the possibility to achieve compliance from Members that
have much more clout. The winning party, especially if it is a
developing country, can be less concerned about its relative
power in the international system when requesting that the
noncompliant party come into compliance. For example, in
Shrimp-Turtle, where the United States faced complaints from
developing countries, it complied with the AB requests to bring
the measures into compliance. 179 Under the GATT panel's
consensus rules, perhaps the United States would have been
able to block the adoption of the report, but under the WTO
automaticity rules, winning parties are able to have the DSB
adopt the reports and enforce the implementation measures.
Lastly, while a losing party may be able to set precedent by
complying, the winning party may be able to establish precedent
for the interpretation of a treaty provision or be able to attack a
widely used foreign practice against it by finding one country's
provisions WTO-incompatible. The Canada - Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals case °80  serves as an appropriate
example. In the case, the United States challenged Canadian
domestic measures related to the sale of imported periodicals,
which the AB found to be discriminatory.'8 ' Daniel Crosbie, a
Canadian trade official, suggested that the United States take
the case to the WTO with a view towards cultural trade issues
affecting a wider audience than just Canada. This provided the
United States with a tactical way to set precedent in order to
179. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58 (8 Oct. 1996).
180. WT/DS31 (11 Mar. 1996).
181. Panel Report, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14, 1997).
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enhance worldwide market access for its magazine industry.
Also, the Canada - Patent Term case 8 2 may be another example
of the United States trying to set precedent in the area of
intellectual property. Thus, winning a case at the WTO might
provide two benefits: both being able to change the specific
WTO-incompatible measures at hand and setting an
international precedent.
2. Disadvantages
a. Losing Respondent
While the WTO system allows the prolongation of a dispute
for years, in the end, the member in noncompliance must either
bring its measures into compliance with its obligations under
the WTO or be faced with suspension of concessions and
retaliation by the complaining party. In the final stages of the
proceedings, the member must decide to either garner enough
political will domestically to comply with the rulings, bear the
cost of compensating the other side for its measures, or weather
the retaliation against its measures.
Having subjected itself to WTO jurisdiction by being a
member of the organization, the member has little choice in
determining its courses of action under the circumstances
without undermining the organization or its position within the
organization. Although the WTO lacks a formal enforcement
mechanism, the losing country is faced with the international
pressure against it because the panel or AB report has been
adopted by the DSB through consensus. The potential spillover
effects of noncompliance in other diplomatic arenas are very
real, as with the deterioration of U.S.-EC relations over the
Bananas and Hormones cases. Furthermore, within the WTO,
as stated above, the disadvantage to a losing party for
noncompliance might affect its own ability to bring credible
cases in front of the WTO dispute settlement system. If it is not
willing to conform to rulings against its practices, why should
any country against which the noncompliant party has
complaints change its own measures? In other words, by
obstinately refusing to comply, the noncompliant Member might
give other Members the justification to forgo the unconditional
reciprocity of WTO principles and undermine the WTO as a
182. Canada-Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170 (6 May. 1999).
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whole.
Another disadvantage for the losing party under the WTO
system, as in Hormones and Bananas, is that the suspension of
concessions/retaliation taken has not been limited to the sectors
at issue in the dispute. Because DSU Article 22.3 provides for
the possibility of cross-sectoral retaliation, while a losing party
may be noncompliant in deference to specific domestic interests
that are affected by the subject of the dispute, the suspension of
concessions by the complainant may rouse constituencies not
party to the dispute and who are unwilling to bear the burden of
the costs for the dispute. In weighing the injury to other sectors
with cross-retaliation, Members might find their interests better
served if they comply.
b. Winning Complainant
The winning member may have been able to get a favorable
ruling from a panel or the AB, but where the losing party is
noncompliant, there may be a sense that the complainant has
followed all the procedural rules but has failed to reach an
acceptable solution to the problem at hand. As long as the
noncompliant party stalls compliance, the complaining party
cannot receive any relief as compensation in international law,
unlike in domestic law, is not retroactive.18 3 While the
complainant can go through a DSU Article 21.5 panel, Article 22
arbitration, and retaliation, the process is expensive, especially
for developing countries, to risk unacceptable results, politically
and economically. Moreover, while retaliation is a punitive
measure meant to hurt the party causing the injury
economically, measures such as ad valorem tariffs' 84 or import
bans also hurt domestic producers and consumers. For example,
the 100% ad valorem duties that the United States placed on
183. Compensation in the WTO is usually prospective.
184. A tariff is a tax on imported goods. It is levied at the point of entry and paid
to the government of the importing country. In other words, a tariff is a customs
duty on merchandise imports. Tariffs are levied either on an ad valorem basis
(percentage of value) or on a specific basis (e.g., $7 per 100 kg). Tariffs give price
advantage to locally produced goods and raise revenues for the government. Tariffs
are allowed to protect domestic industries. However, they are reduced through
negotiations between countries in the WTO and then they are "consolidated." This
means that they cannot be increased again unless the principally affected exporting
countries, which negotiated the concession, are compensated by concessions on other
products. GATT, supra 1, art. XXVIII. Tariffs have been reduced in the previous
eight trade Rounds, as a result of which the EU average industrial tariff is now
about 3%, down from 35% in 1947.
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some European goods in conjunction with the banana and beef
hormone disputes, doubling of the price of such goods as Italian
coffee makers, truffles, Rocquefort Cheese, and handbags, may
have hurt European producers, but they also made the prices of
these goods prohibitively expensive for U.S. businesses and
consumers. In this way, the retaliatory measures, which are
designed to hurt the economy of the party causing the injury,
actually end up hurting the complaining party's economy,
compounding the effects of the unfair trade practice of the
noncompliant member that caused the dispute.
B. NAFTA CHAPTER 20
1. Advantages
a. Losing Respondent
While the losing party is bound by the decision of the
NAFTA arbitral panel with regard to nullification and
impairment, it is not bound by a recommendation to bring its
measures into conformity. The NAFTA Article 2018 text states
that "the disputing Parties shall agree on the resolution of the
dispute, which normally shall conform with the determinations
and recommendations of the panel. ... " 8 5 The language suggests
that the ultimate burden for the nature of the resolution falls on
the parties to negotiate and that the panel report is more like a
guideline. As discussed above, the showing of good faith in
terms of implementation is the basis on which to avoid
suspension of benefits even when implementation has not
actually occurred. A good example of this is the Mexican
Trucking case, in which the United States has taken nine
months to complete its rule-making processes to proceed
towards implementation. Even though the United States has
not fully complied as of January 2002, Mexico has refrained
from retaliating because of the Bush Administration's showing
of good faith attempts to comply.
Second, apart from the good faith requirement, the
ambiguous nature of the thirty days for implementation could
also be advantageous to the losing party. While attempting to
show that it is trying to make progress in implementation, the
185. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 2018 (emphasis added).
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Party can in effect take as long as it wants to comply. The party
is not constrained by a WTO-like RPT, nor does it have to face
implementation surveillance by the DSB or 21.5 panels. The
solution reached and implemented is wholly diplomatic once the
panel issues its ruling. Again, in the Mexican Trucking case,
Mexico has allowed the United States to take the time necessary
beyond the thirty days to bring its measures into compliance.
Mexico also did not retaliate in the Broomcorn case even though
it took the United States nine months to remove its safeguard
measure. The thirty-day requirement de facto provides much
flexibility.
Third, under NAFTA, any retaliation or suspension of
concessions taken by the aggrieved party is capped by WTO
obligations. This means that the complaining party may not
transgress its WTO tariff bindings or other obligations to gain
compensation for a ruling under a NAFTA panel. Thus, the
punitive capacity of the NAFTA Chapter 20 retaliation is
limited and the violating party is less likely to face exorbitant
damage sums.18 6
b. Winning Complainant
Although the rules may be much less detailed, the NAFTA
winning party may be able to use diplomatic channels to come to
a quicker solution than if the procedures were more
comprehensive. First, following a consultation period which
requires more disclosure of information than do the WTO's
obligations to consult, the parties may be able to come to a
solution on the basis of increased openness. Second, there is
mandatory involvement by the Free Trade Commission under
the NAFTA, while under the DSU, the involvement of the
Director General to offer good offices, conciliation, and
mediation is invoked on a purely voluntary basis by the parties
to the dispute. This second stage of mediation-like involvement
by the Free Trade Commission-which can be likened to the
DSB in that both have national representatives as members-
may provide for yet another possibility of resolution. Third, if a
panel is required and finds for the complaining party, there are
no further delays with appeal procedures as with the AB.
186. On this point, see Kwak, K & Marceau, G. "Overlap and Conflicts of
Jurisdiction between the World Trade Organization and Regional Trade
Agreements," The Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XLI, 2003, pp. 83-
152.
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Finally, the thirty-day period to resolve the situation or take
good faith steps to set up a schedule for resolution might provide
a better chance for immediate relief if the losing party complies
right away.
If there is noncompliance and since compliance is based on
more diplomatic solutions, the close ties among Canada, Mexico,
and the United States as North Americans might serve as a
catalyst for quicker, less delayed compliance. It might be more
difficult for bordering countries to play noncompliance games
with each other within a regional forum, such as the NAFTA,
than it would be for them to do so through the WTO, which sits
in Geneva. So, perhaps, there will be more political will to
resolve disputes in accordance with the panel decision to lend
credibility to the North American regional trade agreement
dispute settlement decision, and the winning party may have
the moral impetus on its side to promote compliance.
2. Disadvantage
a. Losing Respondent
Once a party loses under the NAFTA system, it cannot
appeal the decision. So, its only recourse is to exploit the
diplomatic channels to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution
with the complainant. This is particularly problematic in
situations where the panel could produce a report that has a
lack of specific recommendations which the losing party can use
to bring its measures into compliance. While it has not
happened to date, perhaps such a ruling would be particularly
troublesome for Mexico, as its developing country status may
limit its technical capabilities for compliance.
With the force of the panel ruling and the North American
ties-type of diplomatic thrust, compliance might be an uphill
climb for a losing party to be able to negotiate a solution too
extenuated from the panel findings. And, the immediate threat
of the thirty-day time limit can make it harder for the losing
party not to comply or at least offer a showing of good faith,
provided it has the capabilities. Despite the fact that the
NAFTA structure is disposed to promote negotiations and to
prevent retaliation, the noncompliant party can never be sure
whether or when the aggrieved party will decide to suspend
concessions and impose retaliation.
In addition, the NAFTA might indeed promote faster
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compliance on the part of the losing party, while in WTO
compliance cases like Hormones the losing party can take
measures to stall compliance. If the Mexican Trucking case had
been decided through the WTO dispute settlement process, the
United States could have done a Foreign Sales Corporation
(FSC) meaning that it could have appealed the case to put off
compliance, as has happened with US - FSC at the WTO. The
NAFTA may have a better chance to get compliance in a
difficult case such as Trucking, which had produced a diplomatic
flurry and Presidential and Congressional dialogue on the
matter. As the developments in the case show, the United
States did not do an FSC and, instead, the Bush Administration
has aggressively pursued compliance with the NAFTA panel
decision.
b. Winning Complainant
Because of the less detailed rules under NAFTA, winning
parties might face a more difficult time to bring a dispute to
resolution than they would under a more rule-based approach in
the WTO. While diplomatic force may, on the one hand, promote
faster compliance by the other side, lack of diplomatic pressure
can have the opposite effect. Since the NAFTA system is based
on diplomacy, changes in diplomatic climate can have a
considerable impact on the workability of the system. On the
other hand, operations at the WTO continue regardless of
diplomatic climate, and the established procedures provide
predictability; ultimate compliance, however, might face the
same difficulties of the NAFTA system.
Lastly, the lack of specific recommendations by a panel can
also be a detriment to winning parties. While the winning party
may enjoy the moral high ground and diplomatic backing,
without binding recommendations or monitoring by a DSB-like
body, compliance may not happen and the winning party may
not know how to advise implementation of the ruling in the
other Party's domestic system.
EPILOGUE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This article has examined both the dispute settlement
systems in the WTO and the NAFTA, and has looked at benefits
and disadvantages to parties in each system. If there were to be
a case which could be brought under either system, which
should a party choose? To answer this question, let us look at
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two cases which may have been brought in either forum.18 7 In
fact, in the Mexican Broomcorn case where a U.S. global
safeguard measure was at issue, the United States actually
argued in proceedings that the NAFTA panel had no jurisdiction
in this matter since it arose under the GATT Article JX188 and
187. The WTO Canada-Patent case and the NAFTA Mexican Broomcorn case
are two disputes that may have been taken to either forum. The Canada -
Periodicals case had to be brought at the WTO since the Canadian measures fell
under the NAFTA Article 2106 and Annex 2106 Cultural exceptions. The Canada -
Dairy case involved a third party, New Zealand, which left no option of the NAFTA
forum. The Mexico - Corn Syrup case concerned dumping which is not covered under
Chapter 20. The United States - Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies,
WT/DS194 (19 May 2000), concerned interpretations of the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; subsidies also do not fall within the
jurisdiction of Chapter 20. On the NAFTA cases, the Canadian Agricultural
Products case concerned Canada's NAFTA tariff schedule. And, the Mexican
Trucking case also arises out of Annex 1 of the NAFTA.
188. GATT, supra note 1, art. XIX. GATT Article XIX reads:
1. (a)If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of
the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement,
including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the
territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive
products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such
product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to
prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or
in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect
to a preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting
party in the circumstances set forth in subparagraph (a) of this
paragraph, so as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers of like or directly competitive products in the territory of a
contracting party which receives or received such preference, the
importing contracting party shall be free, if that other contracting
party so requests, to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in
part or to withdraw or modify the concession in respect of the
product, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to
prevent or remedy such injury.
2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the
provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in
writing to the CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as may
be practicable and shall afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and
those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters of
the product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect of
the proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to a
concession with respect to a preference, the notice shall name the
contracting party which has requested the action. In critical
circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be
difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be
taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition that
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the WTO Safeguards Agreement. 89 The panel, however,
determined that "[s]ince the NAFTA and WTO versions of the
rule are substantively identical, application of the WTO version
of the rule would have in no way changed the legal conclusion
reached" 9 0 under the corresponding NAFTA provision. Mexico
probably chose the NAFTA forum because it has preferential
tariff rates for broomcorn broom exports into the United States
under the NAFTA, and determined that the safeguard measure
affected its rights under the NAFTA tariff schedules. The other
case which may have been brought in either forum is the WTO
Canada - Patent Term case. While American and Canadian
trade officials suggest that the case arose under TRIPS
obligations, identical language of the twenty-year patent
protection exists in the NAFTA.' 91 Thus, this case could, in
theory, have also been brought in a NAFTA Chapter 20
proceeding. The United States probably chose the WTO forum
for the case's precedential value, just as in Canada
consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action.
3. (a)If agreement among the interested contracting parties with
respect to the action is not reached, the contracting party which
proposes to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, be free to
do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the affected
contracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after
such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days
from the day on which written notice of such suspension is received
by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the application to the trade of the
contracting party taking such action, or, in the case envisaged in
paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, to the trade of the contracting party
requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent concessions
or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which
the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (a) of this
paragraph, where action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article
without prior consultation and causes or threatens serious injury in
the territory of a contracting party to the domestic producers of
products affected by the action, that contracting party shall, where
delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend,
upon the taking of the action and throughout the period of
consultation, such concessions or other obligations as may be
necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.
189. Broomcorn, supra note 15, at 19, 149-50.
190. Id.
191. The TRIPS Articles 70.1 and 70.2 at issue in the case, and NAFTA Articles
1720.1 and 1720.2 are virtually identical. Compare TRIPS, supra note 177, arts.
70.1, 70.2 with NAFTA, supra note 8, arts. 1720.1 and 1720.2. Also, TRIPS Article
33 is identical to NAFTA Article 1709.12. See TRIPS, supra note 177, art. 33;
NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1709.12.
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Periodicals.192
For future cases in which forum shopping might occur, the
party concerned would need to look at the factors compositely on
a case-specific basis to determine whether a dispute should be
brought under the WTO or the NAFTA. Furthermore, it is
important to remember that all the NAFTA countries believe in
the rule of law. Whether in the NAFTA or in the WTO, if the
issue is difficult, the forum does not matter. This case-by-case
approach suggests the highly political nature of forum shopping
in the international trade context. For, regardless of the forum
chosen, the dispute between the countries will only occur if
diplomatic channels have been exhausted. It follows that if the
parties are more concerned with rules and procedures, the
officials might prefer to choose the WTO in all cases because of
its highly developed dispute settlement system. However, if a
more diplomatically based solution is on the horizon, apart from
the initial diplomatic attempts, the NAFTA forum might be
more effective. With this backdrop, this section will propose
general criteria on which the NAFTA countries can make an
informed decision under which system to bring the case at hand.
Three questions can be proposed to guide the inquiry. First,
is there a substantive obligation that provides a cause of action
at both the WTO and the NAFTA dispute settlement systems?
Second, if so, is the issue of interest to a NAFTA trading partner
under matters referred to in Article 2005[21193 or a Third Party
at the WTO? Third, politically, may there be an interest in
adjudicating in a broader forum rather than in a smaller forum?
While the first two questions are concrete 'yes/no' type of
questions, the following criteria speak to this third question.
First, the forum chosen lies with the preferences of the
domestic interests who petitioned the action from their
government. Because the WTO is a relatively new process, there
192. Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31 (11 Mar.
1996).
193. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 2005(2). NAFTA Article 2005 (2) reads:
Before a Party initiates a dispute settlement proceeding in the GATI
against another Party on grounds that are substantially equivalent to
those available to that Party under this Agreement, that Party shall
notify any third Party of its intention. If a third Party wishes to have
recourse to dispute settlement procedures under this Agreement
regarding the matter, it shall inform promptly the notifying Party and
those Parties shall consult with a view to agreement on a single
forum. If those Parties cannot agree, the dispute normally shall be
settled under this Agreement.
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is more awareness of the institution. And, the WTO experience
has improved its credibility with domestic groups, and thus they
think that their interests are better served at the WTO. There
could be other disputes or other issue-specific cases where the
private parties think their interests might be better served
under NAFTA. This could include matters that are specific to
North America. Also, for those who view the WTO as a non-
transparent agency controlled by the secretariat staff that has
its own agenda, 194 the NAFTA might provide a more
transparent, diplomatically oriented alternative to faceless
bureaucrats in Geneva deciding the fate of domestic industries.
Second, the parties need to consider which forum has a
more developed set of rules for the subject of the case at issue.
If, for example, a case arose about agriculture or
telecommunications issues in which there happened to be WTO
and NAFTA concurrent jurisdiction, the parties would need to
examine the treaty provisions as well as the previous case law
in both fora to determine which forum would be better equipped
to deal with the issue. A theoretical example could be one in
which WTO and NAFTA obligations differed, and depending on
the issue, the domestic industry could make use of different
provisions in a tactical way.
Third, the parties should ask whether the nature of the case
lends itself more to the WTO or NAFTA fora. If an issue is very
technical, it may be more efficiently dealt with in a more
structured WTO approach. There may be cases in which there
has been a complete diplomatic impasse and the parties require
an impartial adjudicatory body to advise them with specifics on
how to resolve their dispute. Using the WTO in such cases
would be advantageous. Conversely, if the issue is more
politically based, it should be negotiated in the NAFTA system
instead of passing the buck to a formalized adjudicatory body to
make political decisions. On the other hand, when a judicial
194. More transparency and information into the WTO system is being
requested lately. See BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 371-372 (2d ed. 2001). The WTO should
establish rules to publish Panel and Appellate Body reports, as well as official
documents. In this respect, although for the first time in the history of the WTO, a
Panel dispute proceeding was open to the general public at the WTO in September
2005, never has an Appellate Body dispute proceeding been open to the public. This
proves the lack of trust of the public opinion in relation to the WTO's transparency.
There should also be public access to dispute settlement proceedings. There should
be, too, appropriate rules allowing the submission and consideration of amicus
briefs. See. CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY, THE
FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 15-16 (2001).
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body is forced to make political decisions, its credibility can
come into question. Furthermore, noncompliance, particularly in
politically sensitive matters, injures the effectiveness and
credibility of enforcement for both institutions.
Fourth, the parties need to take into account to what extent
they want the outcome of the case to affect broader
international policy. As discussed above in the context of the
Canada - Periodicals case, if any of the NAFTA countries wants
to make an international example out of challenging another
Party's domestic provisions, the WTO is the better forum to do
so. NAFTA rulings may serve to provide precedent within the
regional trade agreement, but do not have further
repercussions. The United States might be more motivated by
whether the given issue affects U.S. policy in other countries
than Canada would be. Thus, in general the United States
might be more concerned with precedential value of decisions
and would be more likely to choose the WTO.
Fifth, while retaliation is possible under both systems in
cases of noncompliance, the parties may need to determine how
much compensation they might seek. If the dollar amounts are
very high, the WTO might be the better forum, while in the
NAFTA, retaliation measures are capped by WTO obligations.
Although the general assumption among the parties is that
implementation will happen, the parties should take into
account scenarios in which it might not and exercise foresight.
Sixth, the parties need to choose if they would like to
reserve the option to appeal the panel decision, which is only
possible at the WTO. If, alternatively, the case seems clear
legally and the complaining party determines that it wants the
least institutional impediments to obtain compliance, it might
be better served under the NAFTA.
Seventh, the parties need to examine the issue and
determine in which forum they might be able to find the most
impartial panelists. In the WTO, the parties can choose
nationals from any part of the world to get the fairest hearing,
although they cannot ensure this at the AB level. 195 In the
195. Some Washington lawyers have, for example, made an issue out of the fact
that Mr. Taniguchi from Japan was the Presiding Member for the controversial
Japan - Hot Rolled Steel decision. For more information, see generally Panel Report,
United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from
Japan, WTIDS184IR (Feb.28, 1999). While in theory, panelists and AB members
are supposed to be neutral and acting on their own accord, personal bias can
perhaps never be remedied.
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NAFTA, however, the panelists are citizens of the NAFTA
countries. This might be helpful because NAFTA citizens may
be better versed in NAFTA issues, but on the contrary the
panelists may not be able to be de jure impartial. The United
States has lost all of the three cases before the NAFTA Chapter
20 panels. Could this be the reason that there have been so few
cases before NAFTA Chapter 20 panels and why the United
States has not brought any cases after losing the first case it
brought under the Chapter against Canada in 1996?196
Finally, the use of the fora will also ultimately depend on
the role that the parties see for each institution, respectively, in
the present and in the future. Currently, as is apparent from the
few cases brought under the NAFTA Chapter 20, one would
argue that the role of Chapter 20 proceedings is exclusively for
the NAFTA specific disputes. Chapter 20 has a promising future
to deal with issues that are not covered under the WTO, if the
NAFTA covers new ground. North Americans may be able to use
Chapter 20 to address disputes that arise out of North American
issues, one being a North American approach to technical
standards where North Americans may be able to agree. There
may also be room for Chapter 20 in North American solutions to
problems of economic integration - what the rest of the world
may not be ready to do or may view as too intrusive, but what
North Americans may find acceptable and needed. Some have
argued that the Chapter 20 system makes sense in a bilateral
setting, but not in the WTO where it may be too difficult to
administer. So its effectiveness in the present and the future
relies on diplomacy.
The future of WTO dispute settlement will depend on the
quality of the work product and the impact of the decisions on
the domestic constituencies of the parties. The AB is acquiring
increased credibility in the oversight of dispute settlement. With
the new set of panelists and the change in leadership in the
WTO Secretariat, the United States will probably be more
inclined to take a wait-and-see approach.
196. Panel Decision, Canadian Agricultural Products (CDA-95-2008-01)
(December 2, 1996).

